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The purpose of this thesis is to answer the question of what determines 
the success of Civil Military Operations (CMO).  With the United States military 
involved in the largest CMO mission since World War II in Iraq, answering this 
question becomes even more important.  In this thesis, success will not be 
confined to tactical, operational or strategic CMO success. 
To determine what causes success or failure in CMO, this thesis will 
conduct three different case study analyses of Iraq based on the three 
predominant ethno-religious regions of the country: Kurdish North, Sunni Center, 
and Shi’a South.  In order to analyze, compare, and contrast these three 
separate cases, this thesis will use three independent variables: integration of 
CMO in all phases of the operations; balance of CMO between the combat and 
civilian operations; and attitude of the Host Nation (HN) or occupied area.  These 
variables set the conditions necessary for CMO success.  
In conclusion, this thesis provides essential principles for CMO planning 
and identifies requirements in doctrine, training, organization, and structure of 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The object of war is to attain a better peace—even if only from your 
point of view.  Hence it is essential to conduct war with a constant 
regard to the peace you desire.1 
If you concentrate exclusively on victory, with no thought for the 
after-effect, you may be too exhausted to profit by the peace, while 
it is almost certain that the peace will be a bad one, containing the 
germs of another war.2 
     — B. H. Liddell Hart 
 
A. PURPOSE 
Since the fall of Saddam Hussein and the occupation of Iraq, many 
governmental institutions have devoted significant amounts of time and energy to 
study why and how the United States should involve itself in future Iraqi 
operations, specifically in the tasks of security, reconstruction, humanitarian aid, 
nation building, and stability.  Along with these studies come debates over how 
the United States should organize as well as participate in these tasks  more 
commonly known by the military as Civil Military Operations (CMO) missions.  
Before debating such issues, one important question should be examined: What 
determines the success of CMO? This question is the overall purpose of this 
thesis. 
If CMO is to be effective in influencing successful operational outcomes, 
principles for success should be developed and analyzed.  Currently, in military 
doctrine, there are no such principles.3  The lack of understanding of what CMO 
encompasses, and the wide diversity of players involved, coupled with the lack of 
principles, creates an environment that is confusing and difficult for any military 
planner.  Although they are not the only CMO force capable of conducting CMO, 
                                            
1 B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy (London: Faber & Faber Ltd., 1967), 353. 
2 Ibid. 
3 William Flavin. Civil Military Operations: Afghanistan: Observations on Civil Military 
Operations During the First Year of Operation Enduring Freedom. 
2 
Civil Affairs (CA) are doctrinally the chief planners for CMO.  Due to this fact, CA 
should have a vested interest in understanding a framework for what determines 
success in CMO. 
B. THE PROBLEM 
What determines success in Civil Military Operations?  Key to answering 
this question is testing my hypothesis with the most current and relevant case 
study today: Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).   
1. Hypothesis 
The hypothesis of this thesis states that the success or failure of CMO is 
dependent on three variables: Integration of CMO in all phases of the operations, 
the balance of CMO between combat operations and civil operations, and the 
attitude of the Host Nation (HN) or occupied area. 
2. The Independent Variables 
These three tentative independent variables were developed from 
historical examples, doctrine, and personnel experience. While Chapter II will 
explain how the variables were derived, the purpose of this section is to provide 
the reader with a definition of each variable.  
a. Integration of CMO into All phases of the Operations 
If CMO are activities that are conducted as part of an overall 
operation, they need to occur as an ongoing process, incorporated into all 
phases of the operations.  The degree of this integration is the independent 
variable.  The phases of the operation include pre-crisis, preparation, 
deployment, hostilities, and post-conflict.4  If the operations are absent of 
combat, the hostilities phase may be minimal, but  for the scope of this thesis  all 
phases are considered. 
                                            
4 U.S. Joint Staff, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations. Joint Publication 3-57, I-10. 
3 
b. Balance of CMO Between the Combat and Civilian 
Operation 
Joint Publication (JP) 3-57 states that “CMO can be broadly 
separated into support to military operations and support to civil operations.”5  
For Iraq, an example of a CMO supporting the military operation would be CMO 
missions intended to help hunt down insurgents.  An example of a CMO 
supporting the civilian operation would be CMO in support of reconstruction.  
With a limited number of CMO forces and resources, key to success is 
establishing the right balance between the applications of CMO into the overall 
operation.  The independent variable is the extent to which the proper balance is 
achieved. An example of an inappropriate balance would be a task force’s CA 
units supplying humanitarian aid to a village to win the “hearts and minds” of the 
locals, while neglecting population and resource control (PRC) measures to 
establish security and prevent looting.  Since many of the CMO missions cannot 
always be neatly divided into these two categories, appropriateness of the CMO 
mission for the given situation is essential.  
c. The Attitude of the Host Nation or Occupied Area 
Development of Host Nation (HN) government, military and other 
existing institutions is essential to achieving the long term goals of any CMO.  
However, if coordination between the U.S. military and the HN is to occur, the HN 
must be cooperative.  The independent variable is the HN’s attitude towards the 
collective U.S. and HN goals.  Although behavior of the HN can be examined as 
a dependent variable when discussing CMO, this thesis will consider the deep 
rooted attitude already instilled in the HN as the independent variable.   
3. The Dependent Variable 
The degree of success or failure of CMO is the dependent variable of my 
hypothesis.  Since CMO is defined as the activities under the commander, 
providing a definition of what constitutes success or failure of CMO is far more 
complex than defining success or failure for the overall operation.  My definition 
of success is focused on CMO; however, it is impossible not to consider the 
success or failure of the overall operational success.                                               
5 U.S. Joint Staff, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations. Joint Publication 3-57. 
4 
Success in CMO can be defined in relation to the overall operations.  In 
the case of peacekeeping or post conflict operations, this would be mostly 
associated with establishing the conditions for peace and the transition to 
legitimate civilian control.6  For example, in support of peacekeeping operations, 
CMO success might be defined as creating the conditions for all warring parties 
to cooperate.  This type of success may also be defined as “cultivating 
ripeness.”7 The concept of “ripe,” which is a perception of the conditions 
necessary for a peace process to begin, is explored in the “theory of ripeness.”8  
In diplomacy, this “ripeness” refers to “whether particular circumstances are 
conducive for negotiated solution or even progress.”9  When a conflict is 
involved, this can be considered the end goal of any CMO.  However, for a post-
hostility operation following major combat, success in CMO might be considered 
the establishment or reestablishment of legitimacy in the HN institutions.    
One of the most difficult tasks in CMO is establishing the measure of 
effectiveness (MOE) of an operation.  In the military there is a tendency to 
establish MOE quantitatively.  An example would be counting the number of 
terrorists or insurgents killed or captured during a given operation.  In CMO, this 
quantitative measure usually comes in the form of number of projects built or 
amount of aid distributed.  This thesis will attempt to establish indicators of 
success that are based on the ability of the HN to keep the peace in a secure 
and stable environment.  Probably the strongest indicator of success in any CMO 
is the development or strengthening of friendly institutions that can maintain 
stability themselves.  MOE are relative to this thesis’s dependent variable and 
                                            
6 Christopher J. Holshek COL, “Civil-Military Measure of Effectiveness: What is it all about?” 
(DRAFT), Cornwallis X Analysis for New and Emerging Societal Conflicts, 7. 
7 Mark Stover “Cultivating Ripeness Through UN Peacekeeping Operations,” Journal of 
International Affairs; Spring (2002): 55, 2: 520.  Mark Stover advances the “theory of ripeness” in 
his article in the Journal of International Affairs.  Although the article focuses on UN 
peacekeeping missions, the same concept can be applied to CMO.  
8 I. William Zartman, “Ripeness.” Beyond Intractability.org, (accessed 05 July 05), available 
from http://www.intractableconflict.org/m/ripeness/.jsp 
9 Richard N. Haass, “Ripeness and the Settlement of International Disputes,” Survival, 
Volume: 30, Issue 3, 1988, p 232. 
5 
should not be confused with the measurement of the three independent 
variables. 
MOE in this thesis is not confined to tactical indicators but is relevant to 
the politico-military end state based on U.S. objectives and strategy.  In this 
thesis MOE for CMO is based on the overall desired outcome of the operation.  If 
the military’s role is to fight and win the nation’s wars, finishing the battle does 
not end when an opposing army is defeated.  As seen in Iraq, the fight may 
continue if an insurgency develops.  The mission is only accomplished when a 
peace is won and an acceptable transition to civilian authorities is complete. 
4.  Framework 
My hypothesis states that, in order for CMO to be effective, there must be 
a confluence of the three variables listed above.  All three variables are important 
in determining the success of the CMO.  Although the hypothesis states that all 
three variables must be addressed to be successful, some of the variables may 
be more important depending on other factors.  Two key factors are the security 
level and the existing capacity of the HN institutions.  Depending on the situation, 
the importance of the factors may vary.   
C. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
A general framework of cause and effect with three different independent 
variables will be utilized to test my hypothesis.  In this attempt, the purpose of 
this study is to determine what makes CMO successful.  Although the post-
hostility phase of operations may be the most intensive for CMO, all phases of 
military operations must be examined.  This examination begins with doctrine 
and planning, and eventually leads to the execution of the CMO. 
This thesis will examine the initial period of OIF as three separate case 
studies.  The initial period of any operation is the most relevant; therefore the 
focus of this thesis will be on that period of time.  The basis for my selection of 
Iraq is that it is currently the most relevant case and it is a case with enough 
complexity to explore different variables.  Just as our current doctrine and 
understanding of both CMO and CA is based on previous experiences in areas 
such as Haiti and the Balkans, current changes in CMO will most likely reflect the 
6 
experience in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom 
(OIF).  In order to make positive changes in CMO, a detailed study of the most 
relevant case should be considered first.  
To start with, a general understanding of CMO must first be established.  
The definition from Joint Publication 3-57 for CMO will be used.  According to the 
joint doctrine, CMO are the activities under the commander.  The military often 
misunderstands the concept of CMO and thinks it only needs to be integrated 
into the operations after major combat ceases.  Additionally, CMO is often 
thought of as an event to the operations, as opposed to an ongoing process or 
activity.  This attitude toward CMO can be also seen in the military educational 
system.  Traditionally, very little thought or time has been put into covering CMO 
in the military’s advanced schools.  In addition, unit training scenarios and 
exercises usually end prior to the post-conflict phase, where CMO is usually the 
most intensive.  This absence of training does not allow the units to train for CMO 
and impedes any learning and understanding of CMO concepts.  Lack of this 
conceptual understanding puts forth a valid reason to examine the different case 
studies and test whether my hypothesis is correct. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis will address the following questions. 
1. Main Question 
What determines the success of CMO? 
2. Secondary Questions 
• Did the ground commanders integrate CMO into all the 
phases of the operations? 
• Did the ground component commanders accept the role of 
the CMO commander? 
• Were the CMO missions appropriate for the operation? 
• Did the ground force neglect any vital CMO missions?  
• To what degree did the attitude of the HN affect the ability to 
conduct CMO missions?  
7 
E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
1. Chapter I: Introduction 
This chapter provides the purpose, background and scope of the problem, 
research methodology, and the hypothesis of the thesis. 
2. Chapter II: Historical Background and Defining Principles 
This chapter provides the essential concepts and understanding of CMO 
necessary for this thesis, showing how the variables were derived through 
literature, historical references, a doctrinal review, and personnel experience.  
This chapter will also provide a list of essential players in CMO and a basic 
understanding of CMO terminology. 
3. Chapter III: Case Study Analysis 
This chapter provides a detailed analysis of Iraq, sub-divided into the 
Sunni Arab, Shi’a Arab, and Kurdish areas.  In each case study, a brief 
background of the operation will be given, along with a detailed study from 
planning to the execution.  
4. Chapter IV: Comparing and Contrasting of the Case Studies 
This chapter will compare and contrast the case studies from the previous 
chapter.   
5.  Chapter V: Conclusion, and Recommendations 
This chapter will provide a summary and conclusion of the thesis based on 
the analysis.  Additional recommendations for policy and future studies relevant 
to CMO will be presented. 
F. RELEVANT LITERATURE 
Very little literature has been written on either CMO or CA.  Although small 
anecdotes can be derived from books on war and low-intensity conflicts, only a 
few historical examples can be found that directly cover the subject of CMO or 
even CA.  A few other references to CMO can also be drawn from academic 
studies on peacekeeping and other interventions.  The following are examples of 
literature relevant to CMO, but these few samples only scratch the surface of 
understanding the complexity of CMO.  
8 
A Bell for Adano, written by John Hersey, is a fictional book based on a 
Civil Affairs officer in Italy.  Although the book is fictional, there are key concepts 
and lessons that can be drawn from the main character.  Major Victor Joppola is 
a Civil Affairs officer who is essentially in charge of the military governance in a 
small Italian town.  Major Joppola becomes the American authority in this town 
and uses his influence to empower the locals to take charge of their own affairs.  
He does this in way that gives credit to the locals and not the occupying force.  At 
the same time, Major Joppola must coordinate loosely organized American 
forces in the area while not always having the direct authority to do so.  
Conflicting interests and ideals over what needed to be done as opposed to what 
he was allowed to accomplish eventually gets him relieved of the assignment.10 
The book advances concepts and ideals that can be applied to situations during 
CMO today. 
Waging Peace, by Rob Schultheis, is a non-fictional account of a civil 
affairs team in Iraq.  In contrast to the previous book, Civil Affairs Team–A (CAT-
A) 13 did not have the authority to empower the locals.  Regardless, CAT-A 13 
goes beyond what they are required to perform to deliver aid and make lives 
better for Iraqis.  Although an interesting and enjoyable book to read, Waging 
Peace does not go beyond a limited picture that the team members see at the 
tactical level.  The book concludes by providing recommendations for CA in Iraq 
which focus on either more CA or more training.  The recommendations are 
limited and do not provide any basis for how CA relates to the bigger picture of 
CMO.11   
Winning the Peace is a collected study supported by the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Association of the United 
                                            
10 John Hersey, A Bell for Adano (New York: Sun Dial Press, 1945). This book was a 
required reading for Anna Simon’s Military Advisor class at the Naval Postgraduate School.  
Although John Hersey won the Pulitzer Prize for the book in 1945 and is one of the few books 
written on the subject, it is not a widely read by Civil Affairs officers. 
11 Rob Schultheis, Waging Peace: A Special Operations Team’s Battle to Rebuild Iraq. (New 
York: Gotham Books, 2005).  Although I criticize the book for being limited and not covering 
CMO, credit should be given to the author who has written the first book on CA in 50 years.  The 
book at the very least should be read by military officers wanting to gain an understanding of how 
a tactical CAT-A operates. 
9 
States Army (AUSA) that focuses on how the United States should address the 
problem of post-conflict reconstruction.  Although the book focuses primarily on 
the “nation building” aspects of the aftermath of conflict, it still provides essential 
concepts and background necessary for this thesis.  The book sets out to answer 
the following questions: “What is needed to rebuild countries after war?  How can 
the United States improve its capacity to succeed at post-conflict reconstruction? 
And, when and how should the United States use this capacity?”12 One concept 
that should be a constant reminder while developing ideas on CMO, is that 
whether or not we want to, the United States is in the business of doing “nation 
building.”  Robert C. Orr discusses how state failure will essentially lead to war in 
some form, whether it is inter- or intra-country specific.13 
A recently published Rand study, America’s Role In Nation Building, is an 
analysis of U.S. involvement on “nation building.”  James Dobbins, the lead 
analyst, provides an understanding of the most advantageous methods for these 
operations.  The study’s central thesis is that the key variable in measuring 
success in these “nation building” operations has been the “level of effort” put 
forth to conduct the missions.  Dobbins states the main distinguishing feature 
between the success or failure of “nation building” has not been culture, 
development or cultural homogeneity of the country but “the level of effort.”  He 
measures this level of effort with time, manpower, and money.14 
The concepts in these readings support the need to more systematically 
address “nation building” and “post-conflict reconstruction.”  However, these 
books appear to neglect the importance of a limited “window of opportunity” that 
exists in an operation.  Even if the military does not have the primary role to 
conduct “nation building,” it may be the only organization in the position to 
                                            
12 Robert C. Orr ed.  Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict 
Reconstruction. Washington D.C.: The CSIS Press, 2004, 3.   
13 Ibid. 
14 James Dobbins et.al. America’s Role In Nation Building: From Germany to Iraq: (Santa 
Monica. RAND, 2003), xxv.  This book provides an understanding of the big picture regarding 




capitalize on that “window of opportunity.”  For this reason, this thesis will 
address issues that occur in “nation building” from the military perspective and 






II. UNDERSTANDING CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS 
This chapter provides the basic information needed to understand the 
scope of this thesis.  Much of the information in this chapter may appear very 
basic to an experienced CMO planner; however, even in the active component of 
CA, there are newly designated field grade officers that have no CMO or CA 
experience.  This chapter is intended to benefit both, either as a review or as an 
introduction. Since CMO occurs along the full spectrum of combat operations as 
well as stabilization, it is inherently a complex task to devise a doctrine that would 
suggest the techniques and procedures that are the most effective for any given 
situation.  It becomes even more difficult to apply the terminology of 
governmental and civilian agencies involved and translate them to more familiar 
military terminology.  This section will review CMO doctrine and terminology, 
discuss the different players involved, give a brief history of modern CMO and 
explain the development of the hypothesis.   
A. CMO DOCTRINE 
The military views doctrine as a playbook of the principles an organization 
or institution uses to operate in its environment.15  In CMO, multiple 
organizations and institutions are involved who all have their own playbook and 
view of how operations should be conducted.  This section will review CMO 
doctrine. 
1. Defining Civil Military Operations 
The Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations defines CMO as: 
The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or 
exploit relations between military forces, governmental and 
nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the 
civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in 
order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve 
operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include 
performance by military forces of activities and functions normally 
the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government.  
These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other 
                                            
15 Thomas K. Adams, US Special Operations in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional 
Warfare, (London: Franc Cass Publishers.1998), 13. 
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military actions.  They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of 
other military operations.  Civil-military operations may be 
performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by 
a combination of civil affairs and other forces.  Also called CMO.16 
This thesis will begin explaining CMO by providing the joint definition.  JP 
3-57, the joint doctrine for CMO, gives a broad definition for CMO that 
encompasses almost every level of CMO that the U.S. may perform throughout 
the full spectrum of military operations.  Key points in this definition are that CMO 
are activities of the commander; they must support the overall plan in accordance 
with U.S. objectives; and they can be performed by any force.   
Currently CMO has seven different missions.  Although it is not the 
purpose of this thesis to have this list act as a limitation, it does provide a 
baseline understanding for the possible CMO missions that can be conducted 
during an operation.  CMO forces can perform these missions separately or 
simultaneously: 
Foreign humanitarian assistance – is conducted to relieve or 
reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other 
endemic conditions. 
Population and resource control – assists HN governments or de 
facto authorities in retaining control over their population centers 
and resources to preclude complicating problems that may hinder 
accomplishment of the Joint Force Command’s (JFC’s) mission. 
Nation assistance operations – involve civil or military assistance 
rendered to a nation by US forces within that nation’s territory 
during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war, based on 
agreements mutually concluded between the United States and 
that nation. 
Military civil action – involves activities intended to win support of 
the local population for the foreign nation and its military.  Military 
civic actions are predominately conducted by indigenous military 
personnel, while US forces provide advice, supervision, or technical 
support. 
                                            
16 U.S. Joint Staff. Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations. Joint Publication 3-57, 
Washington D.C.: U.S. Joint Staff, 08 February 2001. 
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Emergency services – are all the activities and measures designed 
or undertaken to: minimize the effects upon the civilian population 
which would be caused by a disaster; deal with the immediate 
emergency conditions which would be created by any such 
disaster; and effect emergency repairs to, or the emergency 
restoration of, vital utilities and facilities destroyed or damaged by 
any such disaster. 
Civil Administration – is a unique action undertaken by US 
commanders only when directed or approval by the National 
Command Authorities (NCA).  Civil administration support consists 
of planning, coordinating, advising, or assisting those activities that 
reinforce or restore a civil administration that supports US and 
multinational objectives in friendly or hostile territory. 
Domestic Support Operations – usually occur after a Presidential 
declaration of a major disaster and are designed to supplement the 
efforts and resources of state and local governments and voluntary 
organizations.  The US military normally responds to domestic 
emergencies in support of another agency.17 
2. Defining Civil Affairs (CA) and CA Activities 
To further understand CMO, Civil Affairs must also be defined.  Both the 
Joint and Army doctrines define CA as a force, not the activity being conducted.  
Civil Affairs is 
Designated Active and Reserve component forces and units 
organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs 
activities and to support civil-military operations. Also called CA. 
(JP 3-57)18 
The Department of Defense Dictionary defines CA activities as: 
Activities performed or supported by civil affairs that (1) enhance 
the relationship between military forces and authorities in areas 
where military forces are present; and (2) involve application of civil 
affairs functional specialty skills, in areas normally the responsibility 
of civil government, to enhance conduct of civil-military 
operations.19 
                                            
17 U.S. Joint Staff, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations. Joint Publication 3-57, viii-ix. 
18 Ibid, 86. 
19 Ibid. 
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Key points to understand in both of these definitions are that although CA 
may not be the only force that conducts CMO, they are inherently the main force 
involved in the planning of CMO.  This is due to the fact that their activities are 
those that directly support CMO.  Unfortunately, the similarities between the 
CMO and CA terms cause them to be used interchangeably.  Along with the 
confusing terminology comes a misconception of what is involved in CMO and 
CA.  Two other common misconceptions about CMO and CA are that CMO only 
occurs after the combat is over, and that CA has the responsibility of CMO, not 
the operations commander.  Civil Affairs also has the following missions known 
as civil affairs activities: 
• Foreign Nations Support 
• Population and Resource Control 
• Humanitarian Assistance 
• Military Civic Action  
• Emergency Services 
• Support to Civil Administration 
One significant point to note is that the capacity to conduct civil 
governance falls under the CA mission Support to Civil Administration.  These 
skills are known as the CA functional areas, which are present only in the reserve 
forces.  This specialty is what separates the CA Generalist from a CA Specialist.  
The functional specialty areas are divided into four different areas to include: 
Government, Economics and commerce, Public facilities and Special 
Functions.20     
To simplify CMO/CA terminology, JP 3-57.1 explains the relationships with 
a diagram.  Overall, this is the best attempt to explain the role of CMO forces.  
Civil Affairs activities are conducted to support the CMO plan, which in turn must 
be integrated to support the overall military operation. (see Figure 1). 
                                            
20 Dennis J. Cahill, LTC, “What is Civil Affairs?,” Special Warfare, April 2003, 24-25. 
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Figure 1.   Civil-Military Operations Relationships21  
 
One other important definition to understand is the NATO version of CMO, 
Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC). CIMIC Operations are very similar to CMO 
but the NATO definition is narrower and focuses more on the need for 
coordination and cooperation to support the overall mission.  Overall, the NATO 
doctrine regarding CIMIC has fewer complexities than the U.S. CMO doctrine, 
but still has the same overall concepts with respect to command responsibility 
and support of the overall operation.  CIMIC is also how UN military forces 
address CMO.  NATO defines CIMIC as 
The co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, 
between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national 
                                            
21 U.S. Joint Staff, Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs. Joint Publication 3-57, II-7 
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population and local authorities, as well as international, national 
and non-governmental organizations and agencies.22 
B. CMO TERMINOLOGY 
Some military and civilian operations are so CMO intensive, they are often 
just called CMO.  Currently, joint doctrine categorizes military operations as 
either war or Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW).  The army has 
changed its doctrine in these two categories and divided these activities to 
offense, defense, stability and support.  Stability and Support (SASO) is the term 
that has essentially replaced MOOTW in army doctrine.  Currently, JP-3 is under 
revision with the proposal of replacing War and MOOTW with three operations 
categories: homeland defense & civil support; stability operations; and major 
combat operations.  If this wide range of terminology creates confusion within our 
own military, one can imagine the troubles for a foreign military, or civilian 
agencies, working with the military. 
With regard to U.S. military terminology, the following DOD definitions are 
pertinent to CMO.  In the DOD dictionary, there are no definitions for nation 
building, state building, or post-hostility operations.23 
Civil Military Operations Center – An ad hoc organization, normally 
established by the geographic combatant commander or 
subordinate joint force commander, to assist in the coordination of 
activities of engaged military forces, and other United States 
Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and 
regional and international organizations.  There is no established 
structure, and its size and composition are situations dependent.  
Also called CMOC.24 
Peace building – Post conflict actions, predominately diplomatic 
and economic, that strengthen and rebuild governmental 
infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into 
conflict. (JP 3-07). 
Peace enforcement – Application of military force, or the threat of 
its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel 
                                            
22 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Joint Staff. (AJP-9 NATO Civil-Military Co-
operation Doctrine.  Brussels. June 2003), 1-1. 
23 U.S. Joint Staff. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated terms. 
24 U.S. Joint Staff. Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations. Joint Publication Gl-7. 
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compliance with resolutions or sanctions to maintain or restore 
peace and order. (JP 3-07) 
Peacekeeping – Military operations undertaken with the consent of 
all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate 
implementation of an agreement (ceasefire, truce, or other such 
agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term 
political settlement. (JP 3-07) 
Peacemaking – The process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, 
or other forms of peaceful settlements that arranges an end to a 
dispute and resolves issues that led to it. (JP 4-07) 
Peace Operations – A broad term that encompasses peacekeeping 
operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support 
of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace.  Also called 
PO. (JP 3-07.3) 
Stability Operations – promote and protect US national interests by 
influencing the threat, political, and information dimensions of the 
operational environment through a combination of peacetime 
developmental, cooperative activities and coercive actions in 
response to crises (FM 3-0) 
With regard to civilian terminology, other concepts are essential to 
understanding what CMO may encompass during operations.  Many of these 
terms have not been incorporated in military doctrine; some may never be 
incorporated or even accepted by the military.  The following terms are often 
misused terminology in CMO: 
State Building – the creation of new government institutions and the 
strengthening of existing ones.25 
Nation Building – creating or repairing all the cultural, social, and 
historical ties that bind people together as a nation.26 
Post Conflict Reconstruction – the rebuilding of the socioeconomic 
framework of society and the reconstruction of the enabling 
                                            
25 Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century, 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), ix. 
26 Francis Fukuyama.  “Nation Building 101,” The Atlantic Monthly. Jan/Feb 2004,159-162. 
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conditions for a functioning peacetime society [to include] the 
framework of governance and rule of law.27 
C. KEY PLAYERS OF CMO 
Although this list is not comprehensive, these are some of the key players 
that conduct CMO and that are addressed in this thesis. 
1. Military 
a. Civil Affairs (CA) 
Usually the primary planners for CMO, CA should augment CMO 
staffs at every level.   The active component (AC) consists of only one battalion, 
the 96th CA, which is structured to deploy rapidly and provide the initial 
assessment for follow on CA support to be supplied by the reserve component.28  
The reserve component has 95% of the Army’s CA assets and provides both 
tactical CA support and support in functional areas not covered by the AC.  The 
CA functional specialties are the distinguishing characteristics that the reserve 
component (RC) brings to CA.29 
b. Psychological Operations (PSYOP) 
PSYOP units actively support CMO missions.  One of their stated 
objectives is to “facilitate reorganization and control of occupied or liberated 
areas in conjunction with CMO.”  PYSOP can provide key support to CMO by 
“influencing the attitude” toward the U.S., “maximize CA efforts in the area of 
Foreign Humanitarian Assistance by exploiting goodwill,” and by directly 
supporting the Populations Resource Control mission.30   
c. Special Forces 
Special Forces (SF) have been the lead force in major operations 
that were CMO intensive.  Operation Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq, and 
                                            
27 Robert C. Orr ed.  Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict 
Reconstruction. Washington D.C.: The CSIS Press, 2004.  Robert Orr used the definition that the 
World Bank has used since 1995. 
28 A second BN will be formed by 2008. 
29 U.S. Joint Staff, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations. Joint Publication 3-57, II-5. 
30 Ibid, II-7-8. 
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Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti in 1994, are two prime examples where SF 
conducted CMO and even CA activities in order to accomplish their mission.31 
d.  Engineers, Medical, and Military Police 
Engineers, Medical and Military Police are all essential in CMO 
missions involving humanitarian aid and/or dislocated civilians.32 
e. CIMIC 
CIMIC is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) version of 
the U.S. Civil Affairs.  CIMIC has been involved in Bosnia and Afghanistan as 
well as Iraq. 
2. Governmental Agencies 
Numerous governmental agencies are important to CMO.  The two 
agencies essential during CMO are listed. 
a. United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) 
USAID is the lead U.S. agency for economic aid under the 
Department of State.  The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) is a 
USAID organization formed in 1992 to conduct interagency activities with the 
military in response to humanitarian disasters.33  A Disaster Assistance 
Response Team (DART) is a deployable USAID team whose size varies 
depending on the size of the overall operation. 
b. Department for International Development (DfID) 
Not as well-resourced as USAID, the British version is nevertheless 
able to make a significant contribution in terms of humanitarian aid and 
development assistance programs.34 
 
 
                                            
31 U.S. Joint Staff, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations. Joint Publication 3-57, II-7-8 
32 Ibid, II-8-14. 
33 Robert C. Orr, ed.  Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict 
Reconstruction. Washington D.C.: The CSIS Press, 2004. 
34 Pamela Aall and others, Guide to IGOs, NGOs and the Military in Peace and Relief 
Operations,  Washington, D.C.:(United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000), 13. 
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3. International Governmental Organizations (IGO) 
IGOs are International Organizations (IOs) of two or more countries with a 
treaty that governs their existence.  Although some are not as large as the ones 
listed below, they nevertheless may be able to make significant contributions and 
are important to consider during CMO.35 
a.  United Nations (UN) 
The UN is an organization that includes more than just the 
governing body in New York City.  There are specialized programs, agencies and 
numerous affiliated organizations that make up the UN.  Some of their affiliated 
organizations include the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), the World Food Program (WFP), the World Bank Group, and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF).36 
b. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
NATO is an alliance of twenty-six members from both Europe and 
North America.  Created in 1949, the focus of the original twelve members of 
NATO was the defense of Western Europe.  With the addition of fourteen new 
members to include countries in Eastern Europe, NATO has changed its focus to 
the cooperation of all of Europe.  Since the Cold War, NATO has also 
participated in many peacekeeping missions throughout the world.37 
4. Non Governmental Organizations (NGO) 
NGOs are private, non-profit local, national, and international 
organizations that are designed to benefit others according to their own mandate.  
Each NGO is different in size, dedication level, budget and the services they 
provide.  Most NGOs will claim complete neutrality during conflicts but this is not 
always the case when security is required for their operation.  Some common 
characteristics of NGOs are a decentralized approach to planning, an 
independent nature, and an existence that is often dependent on the dedication 
                                            
35 Pamela Aall and others, Guide to IGOs, NGOs and the Military in Peace and Relief 
Operations,  Washington, D.C.:(United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000), 13. 
36 Ibid, 5-32. 
37 Ibid, 75-76. 
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of their employees.  The American Red Cross, OXFAM America, and the U.S. 
Institute of Peace are all important NGOs to consider when planning CMO.38 
5. Host Nation (HN) Institutions 
Often the most neglected players in planning, but the most important for 
the long term goals of CMO, are the HN institutions.  Institutions may vary from 
country to country but they are still important to consider in planning.  The HN 
might have military, police, social, and economic institutions already established 
that could be instrumental during CMO.  
C. HISTORY OF MODERN CMO 
The purpose of this historical background is to provide a basis of 
understanding for the types and frequency that CMO have been used in U.S. 
wars and interventions throughout the world. 
Although the concept of CMO may have been around since the beginning 
of warfare, the beginning of modern day U.S. CMO began during World War II 
when the War Department activated a Civil Affairs Division (CAD) as part of the 
Army General Staff.  Initially, CA officers trained by the British, established a 
three-month training course to be taught at ten different American universities.  
The British trained their officers at Cambridge.  These officers became the 
military governors in the former German occupied areas.  This program was 
called military governance in the German areas and Civil Affairs in the friendly 
areas formally occupied by the Germans.39 
Led by MAJ General John H. Hilldring, the CAD had over 6,000 trained 
CA officers by the end of World War II.  Although the CA officer’s primary mission 
was governance, they assisted civilians in other missions similar to CA today.  
The CAD also assisted civilians in humanitarian projects.40  Toward the end of 
                                            
38 Pamela Aall and others, Guide to IGOs, NGOs and the Military in Peace and Relief 
Operations, Washington, D.C.:, 89-180. 
39 Earl F. Zeimke, “Civil Affairs Reaches Thirty,” Military Affairs, Vol. 36, no. 4
 (December 1971): 130-131.  
40 Thomas K. Adams, US Special Operations in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional 
Warfare. (London: Franc Cass Publishers.1998). 39-40. 
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1945, Secretary of War Henry Stimson attempted to transfer the control of the 
post-conflict territories to the State Department.  However, no civilian 
organization had the trained personnel or the resources to take control.  Once 
governance began to be handed over to the HN, the CAD was eventually 
disbanded, retaining only one reserve unit.41    
Immediately after the occupation of Germany, a constabulary force was 
formed to take on police duties and to establish law and order. This force was 
intended to make up for the regular combat troops that were beginning to rotate 
home. These soldiers performed occupation duties such as checkpoints and 
security patrols.  The force grew to 30,000 and took on duties until the HN police 
could be trained.  This force eventually trained the German police.42 
 During the Korean War, there was little emphasis on CMO besides what 
could be done to control the movement of refugees.  Commanders treated Civil 
Affairs as an afterthought, and usually involved CA after operations as “disaster 
relief.”  Since the South Korean government was mostly functional throughout the 
war, the opportunity for military governance did not present itself as it did in 
World War II.  In addition, more NGOs began to appear on the scene, as well as 
the UN and State Department assets, specializing in civil assistance. This 
created more confusion within the realm of CMO, with “overlapping 
responsibilities and unclear mandates.”43 
 During the Vietnam War, CA and PSYOPS were used in conjunction with 
Special Forces units in a counterinsurgency role.  At the “A” team level, the 
PSYOP officer was in charge of CA, which amounted to nothing more than small 
scale projects.  Larger scale PSYOP projects were conducted also by the 4th 
Psychological Operations Group (POG), which focused not only on the Viet Cong 
with themes of surrender, but also on the civilian population to promote themes 
                                            
41 Earl F. Zeimke, “Civil Affairs Reaches Thirty,” 133. 
42 James Dobbins and others, America’s Role In Nation Building: From Germany to Iraq: 
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43 Thomas K. Adams, US Special Operations in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional 
Warfare, 49. 
23 
of village defense.  However, all this was minimal compared to the overall war 
effort.  After the war, the CA component was once again reduced in size.44 
 During Operation Just Cause in Panama, CMO were needed to control the 
power vacuum caused by removal of General Manuel Noriega and the military 
police force.  As in Vietnam, CA worked with SF, PSYOPS, engineers and 
military police.   With the combat over, CA missions took priority in the post-
conflict operations.  Unfortunately, the integration of these CA units and the 
planning for this post-conflict phase did not occur in the 22 months of planning 
leading up to the invasion.  However, once in country, the Military Support Group 
(MSG), consisting of both Special Operation Forces (SOF) and Conventional 
support units, rebuilt the police force and instilled in the Panamanians confidence 
in their government.  Although meeting with a considerable amount of success, 
this CMO mission was eventually closed due to pressure by the U.S. embassy.45 
 During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, CMO planning was 
once again an afterthought.  Once CA units did arrive in theater, they were 
organized under Army Central Command (ARCENT).  Most of these units were 
reservists who required a significant amount of preparation before they could be 
deployed.  Once in theater, CA units worked on the post-war planning with the 
U.S. State Department.  When the ground war was over, CA units helped restore 
basic services and informed commanders and troops about Iraqi culture.46 
 Once again, in Operation Provide Comfort in northern Iraq, CA and 
PSYOPS units teamed with SF to provide humanitarian relief to the Kurds who 
were in refugee camps near the Turkish border.  While SF units worked directly 
with the Kurds, CA worked with the NGOs and other relief organizations.  
PSYOP teams acted as a communication link to distribute information to the 
Kurds and helped provide an orderly flow of aid to the population.  Eventually the 
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45 Ibid, 228. 
46 Ibid, 236. 
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mission was transferred to the UN while NGOs remained in Northern Iraq to 
continue the humanitarian work.47 
 During Operation Restore Democracy in Haiti in 1994, deploying SF units 
received their CA and PSYOP attachments early for planning.  During these 
operations, CA was involved in two different CMO missions, one was Civil 
Administration, and the other was Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.  Civil Affairs 
attached to the Conventional units set up Civil Military Operation Centers 
(CMOCs) in the principal cities to coordinate with the NGOs, while SF, along with 
CA and PSYOPS, operated in the countryside.  Essentially these elements acted 
as the local government until they could bring the local Haitian government to a 
operational status.  To help with the judicial system, a 15-member Ministry 
Advisory Team, consisting of CA reservists, was attached to the U.S. Embassy.  
In 1995, the mission was transferred from the U.S. to the UN. The Haitians would 
take control after the elections.48 
 Just two years after Haiti, the U.S. began one of their largest CMO 
missions since World War II with Operation Joint Forge in Bosnia.  U.S. Army CA 
officers worked with CIMIC to help coordinate the civilian agencies with the 
military.  In the case of Bosnia, CA and CIMIC worked mostly with the IGOs, and 
NGOs on the reconstruction, which could be considered part of Nation 
Assistance Operations.  Central to the CMO mission of Bosnia was the 
cooperation of the civilian organizations and the military.49 
  During Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) In Afghanistan, the 96th CA 
Battalion was the first CA unit to deploy to Afghanistan with the primary mission 
of humanitarian aid.  CA and CIMIC units worked with IGOs, and NGOs to 
provide aid and small impact projects while the combat will still going on.  In 
addition to CA units on the ground, CMO coordination was helped by having UN 
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and NGO representatives at U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) headquarters.  
Today, there are still CA units working in a joint military and civilian capacity at 
the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).  Although aid during this conflict 
was considered a success for CA, the outcome in Afghanistan today could be 
considered less than optimal.50 
 Currently, there is a large focus of CMO on Iraq and on how to develop 
the CMO capacity in the military.  Plans have been made to expand the AC 
Battalion at Fort Bragg to a Brigade and add more CA specialists to the 
Reserves.  Under the direction of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the 
Army is considering moving Civil Affairs from under the U.S. Army Special 
Operations Command (USASOC) to the U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM).  
With the development of the Army’s Unit of Action (UA) concept, CA officers are 
being assigned at the brigade level.  The following chapter will cover the focus of 
CMO in Iraq. 
D. DEVELOPMENT OF THE HYPOTHESES 
Identifying the variables in the hypothesis that are key for successful CMO 
began with reviewing doctrine, relevant literature on intervention and 
peacekeeping, current government and academic studies on post-conflict 
operations, historical background of CMO, and my own personal experience as a 
Civil Affairs Officer.  Although no one source provided the key to CMO success, 
each contributed to the development of a framework that might determine what 
makes for effective CMO.  The purpose of this section is to give the reader an 
understanding of this framework through the development of my variables.   
1. Integration of CMO into All Phases of the Operations 
Historically, CMO had always been a required activity in American 
warfare.  Before the creation of Civil Affairs as a dedicated CMO force during 
World War II, the level of CMO conducted depended directly on the ground 
commander.  Before World War II, a CMO force was by default the same force 
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that did the fighting.  Whether the operational ground commander exploited the 
relationship between his forces and the civilian populations was completely up to 
him.  The classic U.S. military example of this relationship was that of General 
Winfield Scott during the U.S.-Mexican War.  Almost all references to U.S. forces 
conducting effective CMO, refer to how General Scott turned his conquering 
force into an effective occupying force.  This was experienced again in U.S. 
interventions in both Cuba and the Philippines during the Spanish-American War. 
The formation of the Army CA and military governance brought a whole 
new dimension to CMO.  This signified a dedicated force to conduct CMO.  The 
added complexities of faster communication, larger populations and international 
laws affected the way the peace was to be established.  Creation of a dedicated 
force alleviated some of these complexities but also created difficulties in 
integration.  If commanders in both Europe and Japan had not emphasized the 
need for CMO as far back as 1942, its success might not have occurred.  As 
soon as the territory was either liberated or occupied, the CMO force was 
prepared to conduct their job and facilitate transition to peace.   
Since World War II, the best degree of integration of CMO into operations 
has come with Special Operations Units.  This was seen in Northern Iraq, Haiti, 
and Panama.  This could be attributed to two different reasons.  One is that 
Special Forces (SF) Groups are the only active duty units that have CA 
companies dedicated to them, which can deploy rapidly and plan with them as 
soon as a mission is received.  Second, these operations were so CMO intensive 
from the start that SF detachments were essentially the ones responsible for 
carrying out the CMO missions.  SF Groups planned with the CA and PYSOP 
forces and deployed with the same forces.  This integration allowed for effective 
integration of CMO during planning and the exploitation of the relationship with 
the civilian populations.  These historical examples have contributed to the 
development of the first variable. 
2. Balance of CMO Between the Combat and Civilian Operation. 
In World War II, the CMO mission was military governance.  However, 
other missions became important, such as constabulary duties, humanitarian 
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efforts, and reconstruction.  Today, the process of what occurred in Germany and 
Japan is often referred to as “nation building,” which is more often considered 
“Nation Assistance” in CMO terminology.  The CMO missions in Germany and 
Japan can be grouped under what current doctrine considers support for the 
civilian operation.  After the fall of Germany, the allied force did prepare for 
German resistance forces to continue fighting. The anticipated continual fighting 
from partisan German forces never did occur and these occupational forces were 
able to concentrate on what current CMO doctrine calls support for the civilian 
operations.51 
With the increase of asymmetric warfare in the world today, in addition to 
the information technology that allows instant world viewing of military 
operations, the need has increased to have CMO integrated into every aspect of 
the operations.  In a sense, this has created more missions that the traditional 
CMO forces are not capable of fulfilling.  In addition, conducting a CMO mission 
in the wrong circumstance can have negative long term effects.  An example 
would be giving humanitarian aid to an area that is capable of supplying 
themselves.  Not only is this wasteful, it can cause an area to depend on this aid.  
Deciding what types of missions are essential for the operation is a delicate 
balance of assets and resources.  Without this proper balance, the effects may 
be counterproductive to what the CMO plan is supposed to accomplish.  
JP 3-57 is vague on what it describes as a combat operation and as a 
civilian operation.  For this thesis, understanding the difference is not essential in 
understanding this variable.  The key point of this variable is that the balance 
between the types of CMO missions can vary greatly.  The important 
consideration is that there is an appropriate balance.  Even if the activity is not 
listed as a CMO mission or CA activity, any aspect of Civil-Military relations may 
fall under this variable.   Applying the appropriate balance for this variable is 
essential. 
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3. Attitude of the Host Nation or Occupied Territory 
There is no doubt that by the end of World War II, very few Germans or 
Japanese were fond of the Allies.  Both countries had been bombed to a pulp, 
and almost everyone in both countries had a relative or friend who had been 
killed during the war.  However disgusted Germans and Japanese were with the 
allied occupiers, they did have one thing that stuck in their minds: they had been 
beaten, and were ready for peace.  Both countries had surrendered 
unconditionally and were at the complete mercy of the occupiers.  The events 
during this time period provide the third variable in this thesis. 
No matter how much effort is put into the first two variables, the HN will 
ultimately determine the outcome of any “nation building” or post-conflict 
operations.  If the people of the HN are the only ones capable of ensuring that 
collective goals are concurrently met, there is no wonder why their attitude 
should be a deterministic variable in the hypothesis.52  In successful CMO, to 
include Germany and Japan, the attitude of the HN was conducive for achieving 
the U.S. goals.  Even if at the beginning of the CMO, the attitude is conducive, 
the U.S. must reinforce it through intentional communications and instilling 
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III. IRAQI CASE STUDY  
A. OVERALL OPERATION 
1. Background 
 
Figure 2.   Map of OIF from DoD briefing, March 26, 2003.54 
 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) commenced on the night of 19 March 2003 
when two F-117 Stealth fighter-bombers took off from Al Udeid airfield in Qatar 
with the hope of destroying the Iraqi leadership.  Their mission was to strike a 
“decapitating” blow at Dora Farms located south of Baghdad.  Concurrently, 
Special Operations Forces (SOF) from the Joint Special Operations Task Force – 
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West (JSOTF-W) infiltrated western Iraq to cut off the main highway to Jordan. 
JSOTF-N had begun linking up with the Kurdish Pershmerga forces in the north 
to expel Ansar Al Islam (AI) forces and was also succeeding in keeping the Iraqi 
divisions from pulling away from the Green line, the contested demarcation line 
separating Kurdistan from the rest of Iraq.  SOF also entered from the south to 
mark the way for a two-pronged offensive where the 3rd Infantry Division (3ID) 
lead the attack in the west and the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (1MEF) and 
the 1st British Armored Division (1UK) lead the attack in the east.55 
Briefly after crossing the border, the initial ground units were joined by 
elements of the 101st Airborne (Air Assault) (101st ABN) and the 82nd Airborne 
(82nd ABN).  The 173rd Airborne joined SOF in the north, the 82nd ABN joined the 
west, and British forces continued fighting to secure Basra.  After the initial 
“shock and awe campaign” destroyed much of the communication capabilities of 
the Iraqi units, the 3ID swiftly moved through southern Iraq continuing their push 
toward Baghdad. The major fighting went so well these heavy units were able to 
quickly move on toward the Sunni dominated center of Iraq.  The 101st ABN and 
the 82nd ABN remained in the south to continue fighting Fedeyeen Saddam 
irregulars.  The 3ID defeated Republican Guard forces outside of Baghdad and 
entered the city on 7 April 2003. By 9 April, the city was secure.  Less than a 
week after the fall of Baghdad, the Pentagon declared that most of the combat 
operations had ceased in Iraq.  While the 101st and 82nd ABN secured Baghdad, 
the 4th Infantry Division (4ID) had maneuvered through Kuwait to provide added 
security to the central part of Iraq.  On the first of May, 2003, President Bush 
made his historic speech on the USS Abraham Lincoln, declaring that “major 
combat operations have ended.”56 Leadership at Central Command (CENTCOM) 
would soon realize, however, that “winning the peace” is sometimes more 
complex than fighting a war. 
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Although planning for OIF spanned 15 months, it is not completely 
understood why Phase IV operations, the stabilization and reconstruction plan for 
Iraq, was not clearly understood by operational and tactical units as well as CMO 
forces.  Long processes and the fog and friction of combat operations made it 
difficult for commanders intent concerning Phase IV operations to matriculate to 
lower echelon forces.  From February 2002 until October 2002, CENTCOM 
conducted no planning for Phase IV.  The directive for CENTCOM to stand down 
from planning Phase IV came directly from the SECDEF, as responsibility for this 
phase of the operation was to be assigned to the U.S. State Department.  In 
October 2002, the Office of Secretary of Defense allowed military planning for the 
initial 30 days of the occupation.  In February 2003, the SECDEF put retired 
lieutenant General Jay Garner and the staff of the Office of Reconstruction and 
Humanitarian Aid (ORHA) in charge of Phase IV operations.  The concept of 
ORHA was to have a civilian organization operating under DoD.  The CENTCOM 
CA staff joined OHRA in planning for Phase IV operations.  This isolated the 
chief CMO planners from conducting operational planning with CENTCOM’s 
principal staff.57  As a result, Phase IV plans for reconstruction and stabilization 
did not reach the operational units.  Once in Iraq, Ambassador Paul Bremer and 
the Office of the Coalition Provisional Authority (OCPA) replaced OHRA.  This 
organization also turned out to be understaffed and ill organized to handle the 
scope and scale of a military occupation of Iraq.58    
The CENTCOM CMO plan developed by the 352nd Civil Affairs Command 
(352nd CACOM) focused on the possibility of a humanitarian crisis and dislocated 
civilians (DC).  CENTCOM assumed ORHA was in charge of the planning and 
policy for Phase IV of Iraq.  However, a synchronized CMO plan for the 
stabilization and reconstruction of Iraq was not provided to the CA units or the 
maneuver ground units.59  Instead, the division and brigades were left to their 
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own devices to develop a CMO plan for the post-hostility phase.60  Some of 
these units achieved a higher degree of success than others.  With a large 
variety of CA units, supported ground units, and different civilian and HN players 
to work with, there was a large variety of CMO that occurred in Iraq.  This thesis 
investigates CMO in the three distinct ethno-religious areas to determine the 
causes of CMO success and failure.  
 
Figure 3.   Map of ethno-religious areas of Iraq.61 
 
2. Measure of Effectiveness 
As stated before, success in CMO can be characterized as setting the 
stage to “win the peace.”  For the case of Iraq as well as most stabilization and 
reconstruction, peacekeeping, security, or nation building operations, this would 
begin when the HN warring parties reach a condition of “ripeness”.62  This is the 
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condition when a positive transition to peace can be accomplished.  As in the 
case of Iraq, there are certain indicators that can be used to determine if CMO 
are “cultivating” the “ripeness”63 necessary to make the transition to civilian 
authorities and peace possible.  Once this “ripeness” is met, it must be exploited. 
Traditionally, “winning the hearts and minds” or gaining popular support is the 
baseline measure of CMO success and coming closer to reaching “ripeness.”  
However, gaining popular support is not always possible.  In these cases, areas 
might have to be isolated in order to mitigate their disturbance.  CMO success 
may require unconventional actions that conventional military forces are not 
trained or equipped to execute, but must be accomplished to achieve the 
conditions required for peace.  Many times this success might be revealed in 
second and third order effects that may only be observed over time.  In Iraq, 
CMO success can be evaluated by the peaceful transition to civilian authorities.  
The following are all possible indicators of this type of success in Iraq. 
• Security of the Iraqi people. 
• Basic life necessities being met (food, water, electric power, 
shelter) 
• Support to the Coalition 
• Economic Conditions: Employment 
• Sustainable, Iraq-managed institutions 
• Level of insurgency64 
 
B. SUNNI AREA 
This case will focus on CMO in the northern part of the Sunni Triangle. 
Tikrit has traditionally been the center for the Ba’ath party and the home of 
                                            
63 Richard N. Haass, “Ripeness and the Settlement of International Disputes”, p. 232 
64 Anthony H. Cordesman, “Iraq’s Evolving Insurgency,” (DRAFT), Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, (Washington DC, June 23, 2005), 3.  Perhaps more of an indicator of 
failure, Cordesman states that the U.S. failing to plan effectively for “meaningful stability 
operations and nation building was the most serious strategic mistake that led to the insurgency 
and crime.”   
34 
Saddam Hussein.  The most concentrated Sunni Arab area of Iraq, the Sunni 
Triangle, reaches from Baghdad to Ar Ramadi to Tikrit.65 
 
Figure 4.   Map of the Sunni Triangle66 
 
1. Background 
Sunni Arabs, comprising only 20-30 percent of the total Iraqi population, 
have controlled the politico-military infrastructure of Iraq since the existence of 
the state. This ruling legacy began with the Iraqi monarchy when the middle and 
upper classes of society dominated governance.  This control continued during 
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the republic years when the lower class Sunnis ruled, and continued once again 
with Saddam Hussein when the Ba’ath party came into power.67 
In order to maintain control of Iraq, Saddam Hussein ruthlessly purged 
many of his military officers that he perceived as unfaithful.  This purging also 
included many Sunni Arabs.  Nevertheless, most of the key positions held by the 
military continued to be Sunni Arabs.  The Sunni Arabs had a fear of the Shi’a 
uprising and usurping their control in Iraq.  This fear, combined with the brutal 
rule imposed on the Iraqis, allowed Saddam to keep control of the Sunni Arabs 
as well as the rest of Iraq.  Even after the Iraqi Army’s defeat during Desert 
Storm, Saddam was still able to mobilize the Sunni Arabs against the uprising of 
the Shi’as in the south.68 
In the days prior to the Coalition invasion, most of the senior leadership of 
the Ba’ath party and military were Sunni Arabs from Tikrit.  The Special Security 
Organization, a special security guard for Saddam, and the Special Republican 
Guard higher commanders were also mostly Tikritis.  These organizations’s 
primary job was to protect the regime against any challenges to Saddam’s 
authority.  Saddam’s eldest son, Uday, was in charge of the Fedeyeen Saddam 
irregulars, another military organization loyal to Saddam.  The presence of the 
thick layers of regime protection offered by these organizations spoiled any 
possible coups and destroyed much of the Sunni Arab middle class, where many 
of the educated Sunnis came from. Sunni Arabs that were not completely loyal to 
Saddam were always at risk from being persecuted by Saddam.69   
During OIF, U.S. Marines were the first forces to reach Tikrit.  The 4th 
Infantry Division (4ID), originally scheduled to come through Turkey and attack 
from the north of Tikrit through Kurdistan, was unable to participate initially due to 
Turkey’s unwillingness to support combat operations.  4ID, also known as Task 
Force Iron Horse (TFIH), found themselves in the port of Kuwait City unloading 
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their vehicles in a rush to head across the border and provide follow-on forces 
and extra security for the assault into the Sunni Triangle.  The first elements of 
the 4ID crossed the Kuwait-Iraq border on 16 April 2003 and completed a road 
march of over 600 kilometers. This was nearly a month after the start of OIF.  It 
was the end of April 2003 when the rest of the division was downloaded from the 
ships and began moving towards Tikrit.  While in Kuwait, CA forces joined the 
ground component units and integration finally begin at the battalion level.70   
Originally, 4ID had two CA units supporting the division.  The 418th Civil 
Affairs Battalion (418th CA) provided direct support teams while the 446th Civil 
Affairs Battalion provided the Government Support Teams (GST).  The GST was 
a non-doctrinal development that was supposed to precede the civilian teams 
during an interim period.  Late in October, 402nd Civil Affairs BN, originally 
assigned to support British units in the south, joined these two battalions.71  To 
begin planning with the 4ID, two 418th CA soldiers mobilized in October of 2002 
and augmented the 4ID CA (G5) staff.  In January of 2003 these two battalions 
received orders to mobilize and proceed to Fort Bragg.  The 418th CA stayed at 
Fort Bragg until moving to Kuwait at the beginning of April to join the 4ID.  It was 
not until their arrival in Kuwait that teams were integrated into their units.  
However, these CA teams did cross the border into Iraq at the same time as the 
4ID.  By the end of April most of the 4ID, as well as most the CA teams, had 
arrived in Tikrit.  The 418th CA attached 12 of their Direct Support Teams (DST) 
to the battalion level.  The maneuver battalions had operational and tactical 
control of these teams.  The lead CA teams had the primary mission of 
minimizing civilian interference and administering humanitarian aid when 
required.72   
When 4ID first arrived in Tikrit, the original coalition forces in the area had 
done little CMO.  The 418th CA DST teams began conducting the initial 
assessments of the city, identifying “civilian requirements, infrastructure, attitudes 
                                            
70 418th Civil Affairs Battalion, Operations Iraqi Freedom After Action Report. 
71 Hugh Van Roosen, COL.  Interview by author, 26 August 2005, Fort Bragg. 
72 418th Civil Affairs Battalion, Operations Iraqi Freedom After Action Report. 
37 
and key leaders.”73  Destruction of institutional structures was not the only 
problem CA teams faced.  If government buildings had not been destroyed by the 
bombing, looters had completely gutted them.74  In addition to finding Iraqi 
personnel to fill government positions, the CA units had to help rebuild the 
infrastructure from scratch.  The 418th CA set up a main Civil Military Operations 
Center (CMOC) in Tikrit and separate CMOCs in each of the Brigade Combat 
Team’s (BCTs) Areas of Responsibility (AOR).  The purpose of these CMOCs 
was to act as the interface between the civilians and the military to include any 
IOs or NGOs.  The initial HA and PRC missions were completed faster than 
expected and the teams began to work on quick impact projects to help gain 
support from the local populace.75 
For CMO support to the civilian operations, the 4ID Command delegated 
to the ground and functional commanders the responsibility of the different Iraqi 
ministries.  For example, the Brigade (BDE) Commanders were responsible for 
the hiring, supervising, and firing of the province governors.  In addition, the 
Finance BN Commander worked with the banking ministry, the Engineer BDE 
Commander worked with the Construction and Public Works Ministers, and the 
Signal BN Commander worked on communications within the area.  It was the 
job of the GSTs to work with the ministries since there was a limited amount of 
NGO expertise, and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was not yet 
functional.76  The functional commanders provided counterparts for the 
ministries, while the CA forces provided the functional expertise to reconstitute 
the Iraqi ministries.  The functional teams were organized into Public Works, 
Public Health Administration, Public Administration, Public Communication, and 
the Civilian Supply.  Their first mission was to find qualified non-Ba’athist 
personnel willing to fill the required roles in the ministries.  The second task was 
to refurbish buildings and offices that were completely destroyed by looting.  This 
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reconstitution would prove to be a challenge throughout the area.  Due to the 
CPA’s de-ba’athification policy, it was difficult to find qualified Iraqis to fill 
governmental jobs.77  In addition, CPA representatives would not stay in many 
parts of Iraq for extended periods of time.78 
The 418th CA assumed the role as the chief CMO force within Task Force 
Iron Horse (TFIH). The 418th CA Commander established the TFIH Project 
Coordination Cell (PCC) and also provided over 90 percent of the manning of the 
4ID G5 staff section.  The PPC acted as a CMOC and command and control for 
coordinating all the reconstruction efforts of the Division, focusing the efforts of 
the Coalition Provisional Authority, Department of Defense (DOD) and 
Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) Funds.  The 418th CA kept 
the PCC open 24 hours a day.  The main purpose of the PCC was to track 
projects, but it also became the center of coordination for all the “division staff, 
maneuver units, Information Operations, the Effects Cell and the Provisional Iraqi 
Government”.79  Additionally, the PCC facilitated the integration of CMO into the 
civilian operations.80 
At the Division level, the 4ID began to effectively plan and coordinate 
projects into the overall operation at the Effects Coordination Cell (ECC).  The 
Division Fire Support Officer supervised the cell, with the intent to integrate both 
lethal and non-lethal effects of fires into operations.  The ECC became the focal 
point for integrating CMO into the operations.  The 418th CA augmented the ECC 
with CMO planners.  At the Brigade level, 418th CA teams provided tactical CA 
teams to conduct CA activities as well as to provide expertise for CMO planning.  
At the battalion level, the commanders expected to have CMO planning 
augmentation from either the AC or Individual Ready Reserves (IRR).  This did 
not occur.  Some of the battalion commanders put excellent non-CA officers in 
those positions and provided dedicated support to the CA forces.  It often took a 
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month before these officers could effectively integrate CMO/CA into the planning.  
Once done, these battalions achieved positive results from CMO.   4ID battalions 
that poorly performed CMO shared common characteristics.  The ground 
component commander either assigned a weak officer as the S5 or had none at 
all.   In some cases the CA team leader had to perform as both a team leader 
and a CMO planner.  Aside from CMO planning, another common trend for poor 
CMO performance occurred when the CA teams were moved around and 
therefore were unable to build trust with either the ground unit or the locals.81 
2. Integration of CMO into All Phases of the Operations 
Did the ground commanders integrate CMO into all the phases of the 
operations?  The 418th CA BN sent plans officers to Fort Hood.  These planners 
had the advantage of previously working with the 4ID and going through the 
planning process numerous times.  However, they did not have any central 
guidance on planning for anything other than DC operations.  While 4ID was en 
route to Iraq, the CA forces were still being mobilized at Fort Bragg.  The 418th 
CA attempted to conduct planning with 4ID by using secure communications.82  
Not only did CMO planning consist of minimal guidance from higher echelon, it 
was also conducted partially in a separate location.  The CMO/CA plan consisted 
of DC operations and a limited HA/PRC.  The most a CA team leader could plan 
for was some quick impact projects and moving civilians away from the 
battlefield.  Also, these CA officers often performed the S5 functions as the CMO 
planner for the supported battalion.  With the 4ID arriving in Tikrit almost three 
weeks after the initial forces, the timeframe for conducting CMO lagged.  
Effective systems for integrating CMO into the overall operations did not become 
effective until almost mid summer.83   
Did the ground component commanders accept the role as the CMO 
commander?  The 4ID initially assumed it would be entering Iraq through Turkey 
as the main assault element from the north.   Accordingly, planning was focused 
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on DC operations.  The 418th CA put six-man CA teams at each maneuver 
battalion, a Civil Affairs Planning Team at each BCT, and the battalion 
commander stayed at the division.  The 4ID commander accepted the role as the 
CMO commander and gave the 418th CA commander full support.  However, 
there was mixed reaction from the Brigade commanders on how much support to 
provide CMO.  The 418th CA commander could only give advice to the maneuver 
commanders and provide a limited amount of guidance to his teams that were 
attached to the battalions.  Some of the maneuver battalion commanders fully 
embraced CMO.  While others did not actively hinder CMO activity, they did not 
integrate it in their operations.84 
Overall integration of CMO into all phases of the operations in the Sunni 
Arab section was less than optimal, starting with the lack of planning.  The only 
CMO planning conducted was for HA and PRC missions.  Although CA teams 
did join their supported units in Kuwait prior to moving into Iraq, this was late for 
planning CMO at the tactical level.  Much of the level of CMO support was 
personality driven by the battalion commanders.  The largest hindrance for 
integration at this level could be attributed to an Army culture that focuses mostly 
on the kinetic aspects of warfare.  This culture might be attributed to many years 
of not planning and training for the civil dimension of the battlefield and the post-
conflict phase.85  
3. Balance of CMO between the Combat and Civilian Operation. 
Did the CMO missions provide the appropriate balance between the 
combat and civilian operation?  Although HA and other quick impact projects are 
important CMO missions, they may not be appropriate for the given situation.  
CMO may need to be re-prioritized in these instances, where projects are not 
directly helping with either the combat operation or the civilian operations.  It may 
be more appropriate in these situations to concentrate CMO on improving 
security through training the police and providing support to the local population, 
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which the 4ID and 418th CA did.  CMO in the Sunni Center attempted to apply the 
appropriate balance but was handicapped mainly by the insurgent attacks.  Once 
the attacks began, CMO became limited due to 4ID limited resources and focus 
on hunting down the insurgents.86 
Did the ground force neglect any vital CMO missions?  Once major 
combat operations were declared over and Phase IV was beginning, an extreme 
amount of looting occurred.  After the Iraqi Army dissolved and the police force 
had abandoned their posts, a huge vacuum of power was created.  Establishing 
the “rule of law” is an inherent task for civil administration or military governance.  
If establishing “rule of law” equates to establishing civil control, it would also be 
correct to say that there was no attempt to establish this type of control.  Initial 
units in the Sunni Triangle did not establish control.  Even if establishment of the 
“rule of law’ does not fit perfectly into one of the six CMO missions, it is still 
essential to CMO in Phase IV.  Whether it was a lack of policy or restrictive rules 
of engagement, the initial ground units did not stop the looting with either lethal or 
non-lethal means.87  Although constabulary duties may not be an Army mission, 
they are not prohibited.  What must be remembered is the obligation an 
occupying force has to an occupied country.88 
4. Attitude of the Host Nation (HN) or Occupied Area. 
To what degree did the attitude of the HN affect the ability to conduct 
CMO missions?  The initial air and ground campaign made it difficult to win the 
“hearts and minds” of the Sunni Arabs.  Although much of the fighting occurred in 
the south, a majority of the Iraqi Army were Sunni Arabs.  For anyone with a 
relative or a friend killed, this must have resulted in a deep-rooted hatred.  Once 
major combat operations ended, the Sunni Arabs had very high expectations that 
the U.S. would be able to provide everything they needed.  The 418th CA 
Commander described this attitude by giving the example of how Iraqis would 
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say, ”You are a rich and powerful nation and have put men on the moon, and we 
expect that as the rebuilding standard.”89  Sunni Arabs were happy to have 
Saddam Hussein taken out of power but they were not happy having the U.S. as 
occupiers.  Even if the Sunni Arabs were frustrated by the slow process of 
reconstruction, the lack of security made them even more reluctant to support the 
coalition.  In addition, Ambassador Bremer announced his de-ba’athification 
strategy, which disqualified many of the Iraqis from obtaining a job through the 
coalition.90  This was compounded by the fact that complying with the coalition 
would also be recognizing the reality that the Shi’a would likely control a 
democratic state of Iraq. 
5. Summary 
Trying to determine whether there was CMO success in the northern 
Sunni Triangle is a difficult task.  By judging the accomplishments of the 418th 
CA, which included thousands of projects and assistance delivered, one could 
say that the unit did reach a degree of success in their CA operations.  However, 
CMO success is more than just projects and supplies delivered.  The 4ID was 
never able to fully exploit CMO in the northern part of the Sunni Triangle. 
Looking at the indicators previously discussed, the security of the Sunni 
Arabs decreased within a month of the regime’s fall.  Basic life necessities were 
met, but a very large young male population remained without employment.  The 
coalition received very little information to fight the insurgency, an indication of 
lack of popular support.  CMO was rebuilding the physical infrastructure but was 
lagging on building the institutions to maintain this infrastructure.  Once the 
insurgency took hold, CMO became even more difficult to conduct due to the 
force protection requirements. 
The level of insurgency that took hold is the biggest indicator of CMO 
failure in the Sunni Center.  At the same time the 4ID was beginning to effectively 
integrate CMO into their operations, the Iraqi insurgents had already become an 
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effective fighting force and had popular support in most the Arab Sunni areas.91  
Despite the CMO efforts and ground combat operations, the main insurgent 
groups continued to locate in many of the populated areas of the Sunni 
Triangle.92 
The conditions as they related to the variables discussed  resulted in CMO 
failure for the Sunni Center. The integration of CMO into all phases of the 
operations was poor.  Despite efforts to integrate CMO planning at all levels, 
implementation took at least two to three months.  In the beginning of the 
occupation, few of the commanders understood CMO.  Although some of the 
commanders were receptive to integrating CMO, they had mixed success which 
was often dependent upon their relationships with CA forces.   The time needed 
to build an effective working relationship was inadequate when an attachment 
arrived at a battalion immediately before crossing into Iraq.  Most of these ground 
units did not see their CA attachments until right before going into Iraq.  
Additionally, the CA forces attached may have had CA expertise but this did not 
necessarily equate to CMO expertise.  The second variable, balance of CMO 
between the combat and civilian operation, was satisfactory once the looting had 
stopped and a degree of civil order was established.  However, this proved to be 
a lasting problem in the Sunni Center.  Without establishing the “rule of law” from 
the beginning, the ground forces never could gain control.93  The third variable, 
attitude of the HN or occupied area, set impossible conditions for CMO success.  
Arab Sunnis were never willing to work with the coalition.  This attitude, perhaps 
a result of the air and ground campaign, was reinforced by the lack of security.  
The Sunni Arabs were angry and did not want to be occupied by a western 
country.  Instead of mitigating or isolating this attitude, the coalition allowed the 
insurgents to exploit it. 
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C. SHI’A AREA 
This case will focus on the Shi’a area of Southern Iraq.  Karbala, An Najaf 
and An Nasiryah are all major cities which have had a significant impact on the 
history of Iraq (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5.   Map of Shi’a area of Iraq.94 
 
1. Background  
Shi’as in Iraq number approximately 14 million, more than 60 percent of 
the population.  Since the beginning of the Iraqi state, as well as the entire history 
of the territory, the Shi’as have never risen to topple the Sunni Arabs and 
assume power.  Despite this lack of power, the Shi’as have always had a strong 
sense of Iraqi nationalism and do not strive to be autonomous like the Kurds.  
However, their absence from power is a recurring theme in Iraq, and their desire 
for representation has continued since the beginning of the state.95 
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The Shi’as, like the Kurds to the north, were given the opportunity to revolt 
after the Iraqi Army was defeated during Desert Storm.  However, there was a 
huge division between the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq 
(SCIRI), based out of Iran, and Shi’as, who had fought against Iran in the Iran-
Iraq war.  The uprising did not gain the required momentum and backing from all 
the Shi’a political parties.  What occurred afterwards is known as the “destruction 
of the Marsh Arabs.”96  Once the uprising in the south was crushed, Saddam’s 
military force drained the south’s marshes, which turned out to be an 
environmental catastrophe for the Shi’as.  In addition, Saddam used a Blitzkrieg 
of attacks on the Shi’as, resulting in up to 190,000 dislocated civilians.97 
Since the 1990s, numerous religious leaders have emerged to represent 
and also divide the southern Shi’as.  These include Abdel Aziz al-Hakim, the 
leader of SCIRI, with the powerful backing of Iran; Muqtada al-Sadr, the son of 
Ayatollah Satiz al-Sadr98, Abdul Majid al-Khoei, who was supported by the west; 
and probably the most influential, the Ayatollah Ali Sistani.  Although the Shi’as 
are not absent leaders, they do not have one single voice, and Saddam had used 
this division numerous times to keep the Shi’as suppressed. 
When the coalition forces crossed the Kuwaiti border, the British 1st 
Armored Division (1UK) had a separate mission from the U.S. forces: Secure the 
city of Basra.99  Being the second largest city of Iraq and the historical 
commercial center for the Marsh Arabs, the Shi’as there resented any Sunni 
control of the area.  The British knew this and they had built a significant 
intelligence network in the area since Desert Storm.  Even though the British had 
lost their influence in Iraq many years prior, they did not completely lose touch 
with the region, maintaining numerous local experts who spoke Arabic and had 
significant information on all aspects of the culture.  Once the British commander 
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arrived, he chose not to assault the city but patiently wait outside the city until the 
proper intelligence was obtained.  The Ba’ath party still controlled the city, but 
departing residents would provide all the needed information on enemy 
resistance inside.  These Shi’as coming out of the city were seeking food, water, 
and safety as promised to them on printed leaflets.  Special Air Service (SAS) 
and Special Boat Service (SBS) infiltrated the city and made contact with friendly 
Shi’a groups.100 
Ali Hassan al-Majid, also known as “Chemical Ali,” attempted to turn the 
battle for Basra into a messy urban fight.  Most of the 11th Iraqi Division had 
deserted, but a substantial number of Fedeyeen fighters remained in the city.  
For an entire week, the British crept forward into the city using their Special 
Operations teams and snipers.  Once the 1UK Commander felt he had enough 
intelligence, sniper teams started selectively taking out the Ba’athist leaders.  
The goals of this operation were twofold: (1) not harm civilians, and (2) strike a 
heavy psychological blow to the Iraqi fighters.  For the next week, beginning in 
early April, the British began striking enemy positions with light armor.  
Eventually, the British launched a final assault on Basra and completely took 
control of the city.  Once the fighting was complete, the British took off their flak 
vests and did everything possible to promote normalcy in the city.101 
As discussed earlier, the British version of CMO is based on the NATO’s 
Civil Military Co-operations concept.  To the British, CMO is not only a task that 
CIMIC officers specialize in, but the idea of coordination and cooperation is 
inherent to the British Military.102  To help the British with specific Civil Affairs 
tasks, the 402nd CA BN provided the British with direct support teams.  The 
British CIMIC incorporated them into their operations, but they were not used 
initially for CMO planning.  This tasking came at the last minute in Kuwait.  The 
402nd was one of many CA units that were attached to a ground unit at the last 
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minute.  Problems with the attachment of CA teams to the British included 
administration and maintenance, and funding of projects.  However, the British 
provided what they could and even used their commander’s discretionary funds 
to facilitate CA projects.103 
To the west of Basra, the pockets of Fedeyeen resistance still fought 
against the U.S. forces in Najaf and Karbala.  However, the 3ID and 1 MEF had 
blown through the area enroute to Baghdad and the 82nd Airborne (82nd ABN) 
and 101st Airborne (101st ABN) were left to smash any remaining resistance of 
the Ba’ath party in the cities of Najaf and Karbala.  At first, the 1 MEF and 3rd 
Army were bottlenecked in Al Nasiriyah and had to fight their way though.  The 
U.S. forces were unable and perhaps unwilling to be as methodical as the British 
were in Basra.  Nevertheless, as the U.S. armored forces rolled towards 
Baghdad and Tikrit, the two light infantry units secured the cities in the south. 
The 82nd ABN had two CA planning officers and a CA Team from E/96th 
CA had been attached for almost three months.  The Division G-5 was deployed 
to Afghanistan when this attachment began planning at the 82nd in November 
2003.  Their focus was immediate humanitarian aid and minimization of civilians 
on the battlefield.   The 82nd stayed in this area for approximately one month, 
where CMO consisted of bringing in humanitarian aid flights to supply the 
hospitals, meeting with key leaders, and conducting assessments for the follow 
on forces.  The people in the area treated the ground forces as liberators but also 
wasted no time in looting whatever they could from former Ba’athist buildings.  
The 82nd ABN did not control the looting.104  In addition to this looting, Abdul 
Majid al-Khoei was assassinated while meeting with other clerics at a mosque in 
Najaf.  Having met with Tony Blair during his 12 years in exile, it is believed he 
was killed by assassins sent by Al Sadr to prevent the cooperation with the 
coalition.105 
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 Once the Marines returned to the Shi’a area in the south, they immediately 
began to assert control over their assigned area.  The Marines had their own 
Civil Affairs Groups (CAG); however, U.S. Army Civil Affairs were also attached.  
The 402nd Civil Affairs Battalion (402nd CA) supplied direct support teams that 
worked along side the Marine CAG, while the 304th CA BDE supplied 
government support teams (GSTs) that were attached to every Marine battalion.  
These GSTs consisted of medical, engineer, legal, education, and even 
maintenance personnel, and were designed to help the newly formed ministries.  
Although headed by a CA Lieutenant Colonel, it was the Marine battalion 
commander that was in charge of GST and supported them.  This relationship 
was effective and all the Marine commanders accepted responsibility for the 
GSTs.  The GSTs did not have a problem finding locals to begin the 
reconstruction of the country.  Additionally, in the south, the Ayatollah Sistani, 
although not in direct contact with the U.S, did tell the Shi’as to cooperate with 
the coalition.106  For the Marines, CMO was not treated as a separate staff 
function but was an inherent part of their operations.107  
2. Integration of CMO into All Phases of the Operations 
Did the ground commanders integrate CMO into all the phases of the 
operations?  Although the British 1UK did not have enormous resources, they did 
have access to supplies and the benefit of the Humanitarian Activity Center 
(HAC) in Kuwait.  This made it easy to coordinate for HA.  Once in Basra, the 
British set up a city council to work with the local leaders.  Receiving direct 
support teams from the 402nd CA BN was an added benefit.  Before crossing into 
Iraq, Marine CAG officers briefed the 1 MEF staff on Phase IV and the Marines 
began integrating CMO planning into their operations.  Once the major combat 
operation ceased in the Shi’a south, the 1 MEF increased the integration of CMO 
in their daily operational planning.  In addition, the Marines directly linked the 
CMOC activities into their operational planning.108 
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Did the ground component commanders accept the role as the CMO 
commander?  Marine and British commanders, both tactical and operational, 
accepted their role as the CMO commander.  This was evident by the British 
Commander using his discretionary funds to resource projects by the 402nd CA 
and the Marine commander taking responsibility for the GST teams.  The British 
took into consideration the implications of fighting in urban areas, and ran a slow, 
deliberate campaign to avoid civilian casualties.  This is one instance where 
CMO during the major combat was fully integrated and proved effective in 
influencing the operational outcome. 
3. Balance of CMO between the Combat and Civilian Operation. 
Were the CMO missions appropriate for the operation?  The British forces 
effectively used CMO to gain information when conducting combat operations in 
Basra.  Once major combat operations ceased in the south, U.S. Army CA units 
continued to provide HA and a limited amount of PRC.  Throughout the advance 
through southern Iraq, units used the appropriate amount of PRC to ensure that 
civilians were not on the battlefield.  Once fighting ceased, CIMIC and CA units in 
the British and Marine sectors utilized CMO to maintain security and rebuild the 
country.  Since the infrastructure in the south was in disrepair after Saddam’s 
rule, HA came at the right time and was appropriate.  
Did the ground force neglect any vital CMO missions? There is very little 
information available on military civic action that occurred in the 1UK and 1MEF 
sectors.  However, the CA units did attempt to use Iraqis at every opportunity in 
reconstruction or humanitarian projects. The Marines in the south did establish 
civil control and imposed security and protection for the Iraqis.109   
4. The Attitude of the Host Nation or Occupied Area. 
To what degree did the attitude of the HN affect the ability to conduct 
CMO missions?  As mentioned before, Shi’a Arabs have been a divided people 
and that has been their downfall.  However, they maintained a positive attitude as 
long as they perceived the U.S. as liberators and not occupiers.  The Shi’a are 
the majority in Iraq.  Cooperating with the coalition gives them the opportunity to 
                                            
109 Christopher Holshek, COL, phone interview by author, 09 August 2005. 
50 
control Iraq and no longer be repressed.  The attitude of the Shi’a Arabs from the 
beginning of the occupation was conducive to coalition efforts.  The Shi’a Arabs 
knew that they would have to work with the coalition in order to have more 
control in Iraq.110  
5.  Summary 
 It is difficult to gauge the level of CMO success in the Shi’a South.  
Security was high when the British and Marines controlled the area, but declined 
as they left.  Although basic life services were easily delivered, the number of 
unemployed Shi’a was still very high.  Since the end of major combat operations, 
the Shi’as have given the coalition varying levels of support, but the Iraqi military 
and police have received more support from the local populace.  Institutions are 
being built in the south at a slow but steady rate; however, within six months of 
the first units arriving, the Iraqi institutions were at a stage where they could be 
handed over to civilian authorities.111 
 Very little insurgency has occurred in the Shi’a South.  Even Moqtada Al 
Sadr, who led Shi’a uprisings in Najaf in April 2004, appears to be posing few 
problems for the coalition forces.  Since this “peak of insurgent activity,” attacks 
in the Shi’a South have significantly declined.  There is no certainty that an 
insurgency will not rise in the Shi’a South, but for the time being, most of the 
governates are relatively peaceful.112  
The conditions that resulted from a combination of the variables discussed 
resulted in partial CMO success for the Shi’a South.  The integration of CMO into 
all phases of the operations was fair.  Although Army CA units were attached at 
the last minute in Kuwait, both the British and the Marines had a concept of what 
would occur in Phase IV.  The planning might have been less than optimal, but 
throughout the Shi’a South, the coalition exerted themselves and quickly 
integrated CMO into their operations.  The second variable, balance of CMO 
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between the combat and civilian operation was also fair.  The Marines did 
establish order after some looting occurred.   While CA forces concentrated on 
humanitarian aid and reconstruction projects, GST teams supported the support 
to civil administration mission.  The third variable, attitude of the HN or occupied 
area, was not as conducive as hoped for.  However, the idea that the Shi’a 
needed to comply with coalition goals in order to gain power in Iraq was a 
motivator for the Shi’a Arabs. 
D. KURD AREA 
This case will focus on the Kurdish controlled area of Iraq.  Since Mosul 
and Kirkuk are no longer predominantly Kurdish cities, they will not be included in 
this case. 
 
Figure 6.   Map of Kurdish inhabited areas.113 
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1. Background 
The area of northern Iraq that is inhabited by the Kurds is distinctively 
different from the rest of Iraq.  Some key geological and geographical features 
include the oil-rich lands near Kirkuk, fertile lands near the lakes and rivers, and 
the heavily mountainous areas that separated Iraq from Turkey and Iran. These 
mountains, and a strong will to survive, were what provided the Kurds with a 
means of survival for over a thousand years.  As a people, the Kurds are “Indo-
European,” with 75% being Sunni Muslim, 15% Shi’a Muslims, and 10% following 
various other religions.  Although Kurds practice the same religion as the Arabs, 
the Kurds are distinctively different.  The Kurds wear different traditional clothing, 
have different physical features, and have their own separate history from the 
rest of Iraq.  The Kurds also exist in large numbers in Turkey, Iran, and Syria.  
Nowhere in the world is there such a large nation of people without a state of 
their own.114  Although independence may be every Kurd’s wish, reality will 
dictate they must remain part of Iraq.115 
By the time JSOTF-N began operations in the north, the Kurds had 
endured extreme harshness under Saddam's government.  Examples include a 
massacre that occurred in Suleimanayah in 1963.  General Satiq Mustafa, the 
Ba’ath party military commander, took nearly a hundred Kurds including the best 
athletes, artists and teachers and executed them.  This harshness reached its 
most extreme point during the Iraq-Iran War, when Ali Hassan al-Majid al-Tikriti, 
a cousin of Saddam, unleashed chemical weapons in the highly strategic border 
town of Halabja.  In a matter of minutes, these chemical weapons killed 
approximately 5,000 people.116    
During the aftermath of Desert Storm, the Ba’ath Party government 
withdrew from much of the Kurdish territory, allowing the Kurdistan Democratic 
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Party (KDP) to take control in the West and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 
(PUK) take control in the East.  Both the U.S. and the U.K. unofficially 
encouraged this uprising.117  When it was realized that such an uprising would 
leave the region even more unstable, both countries decided not to support the 
Kurds.  Saddam’s republican guard wasted no time in moving north to begin 
another campaign of destruction until the UN finally established a safe zone near 
Dohuk.  With both the Kurds and Saddam weak from the Desert Storm 
Operation, they made a deal that left control of the northern provinces with the 
Kurds, but the cities of Kirkuk and Mosul would remain under control of Baghdad, 
where Saddam could continue his “Arabization” policy.118 
The area of northern Iraq began to prosper during this time of Kurdish 
autonomy, and nationalism began to grow.  The younger generation of Kurds 
began speaking Kurdish instead of Arabic and the economy of the area started 
prospering to a much higher degree than the rest of Iraq.  But once again, 
internal and external factors affected the area of northern Iraq.  Massoud 
Barzani, leader of the KDP, and Jabal Talabani, leader of the PUK, were at odds 
with each other, and supposedly Barzani invited the Iraqi forces into Erbil to help 
unsettle the balance between the KDP and PUK.  The PUK fled to Sulaymaniya 
and since then the area known as Kurdistan was divided into two sections; the 
area to the west was the KDP and the east was the PUK.  These areas began to 
ideologically separate even more until the anticipation of a coalition invasion after 
September 11, 2001.  This brought an essential need for them to cooperate and 
act as one people again.119 
When JSOTF-N began its operation in March of 2003, an established 
network of political leaders of both the KDP and PUK already existed.  Each area 
already had institutions in place that facilitated a stable economy and basic 
governmental functions.  A combined militia of Pershmerga soldiers from both 
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the PUK and KDP amounted to 80,000 soldiers.  These forces would provide the 
basis for security and civil order throughout the north.120   
Integration of CMO into the operational planning for northern Iraq began 
approximately six months prior to the invasion.  Delta Company, 96th Civil Affairs 
Battalion (D/96th CA) and the 404th Civil Affairs Battalion Airborne (404th CA) sent 
planners to work with 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) (10 SFG) which 
would eventually become JSOTF-N.  The 404th CA planners worked with 10 SFG 
staff to develop the CMO plan and the D/96th CA planners worked with the two 
battalions to develop their plans.  The CMO plan for the entire north was based 
on two priorities; (1) a possible dislocated civilian (DC) population, and (2) 
support for civil administration.  The DC mission was more directly related to 
combat and took priority in the eyes of JSOTF-N Commander.121 
JSOTF-N soon learned that there would no expected mass exodus of 
refugees.  The Pershmerga forces, assisted by SOF, routed the Ansar al Islam 
out of Halabja and into Iran, while the Iraqi army was either destroyed or 
removed their uniforms and headed for home.  During this timeframe, the first CA 
forces infiltrated into Iraq with 10 SFG.  D/96th CA was split into three different 
elements.  The command section stayed with the JSOTF-N headquarters in Erbil, 
while three Civil Affairs Teams Alpha (CAT-A) with a small command element 
went to each SF Battalion in the KDP and PUK sectors.  Although JSOTF-N 
made it clear they were not there to repeat Operation Provide Comfort, they 
nevertheless allowed the Active Duty CAT-As to do assessments and prepare for 
the arrival of the 404th CA.122  The 404th CA began arriving in the beginning of 
April. 
After major combat operations were declared over, 10 SFG, along with 
many other elements of the JSOTF-N, began to redeploy back to the U.S.  The 
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404th CA soon fell under the command of the 101st ABN which controlled the 
Kurdish areas.  Due to the perceived security situation and the need for more 
combat forces in the south, the 101st ABN Commander left the 404th CA as the 
only U.S. military force in the three northern governates of Erbil, Dahuk and As 
Sulaymaniyah.  The 404th CA was given brigade level status and the 
responsibility of being the only coalition force north of the Green line.123 
For the next 10 months, the 404th CA conducted CMO and security 
missions, actively collected intelligence, helped create the Iraqi Defense Corps, 
and served as the coalition ground component in the north.  When they began 
their mission in Iraq, the 404th CA immediately aligned themselves with the 
existing governmental and security organizations of the area.  The Pershmerga, 
which 10 SFG and 3 SFG had fought alongside, would help the battalion conduct 
their mission with a high degree of freedom of movement.  The 404th CA 
maintained strong connections with the Pershmerga forces and civilian 
leadership.  This relationship enabled a proper shaping of the Pershmerga forces 
into the future Iraqi forces as well as providing a base for other security jobs such 
forest officers, the police force and other non-military employment.124 
Usually a sensitive subject for Civil Affairs, the 404th CA saw their role as 
being a base for coordinating intelligence and information within the region.  The 
404th CA facilitated the coordination between the KDP and PUK Intelligence with 
the activities of U.S. Intelligence agencies.  In addition to meeting with the 
ministers, the 404th CA helped organize and operate joint intelligence-sharing 
meetings with local security and intelligence agencies.  These intelligence 
operations came more out of a necessity than a desire.  To fill the intelligence 
void, the 404th CA used soldiers with prior intelligence backgrounds or with law 
enforcement experience to gather actionable intelligence.125 
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The 404th CA conducted Information Operations (IO) by first keeping 
strong ties with the local political leaders of both the KDP and PUK political 
parties.  The 404th CA had to duplicate many of their efforts to work with both 
parties, but this did allow a steady flow of communications between the CPA and 
the leadership of the north and helped to avoid any misunderstandings.  The 
404th CA further exploited these channels by hiring local public affairs officers to 
conduct press conferences throughout the three provinces.  In addition, the 404th 
CA participated in public forums and university lectures.126 
The 404th CA established their main battalion CMOC in the city of Erbil.  
Their primary duty was coordination with the international community, which 
consisted of NGOs that had been in Iraq, even during Saddam’s rule. The Erbil 
CMOC became the center for coordination for the entire Kurdish area as well as 
areas below the Green line.  The USAID Disaster Assistance Relief Team and 
the CPA representatives also co-located at the CMOC.  In addition to the CMOC, 
the 404th CA sent liaisons (LNOS) to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) 
Ministry of Humanitarian Aid Cooperation (MOHAC) to help coordinate with local 
governmental authorities throughout the rural area.  From the CMOC, the 404th 
CA was able to coordinate with the different ministries on issues ranging from 
education to public sanitation.127 
The CMOC also was the focal point on issues with the Pershmerga 
Forces.  The Pershmerga’s 80,000 soldiers had fought with the coalition and 
required demobilization and reintegration into civilian society.  The 404th CA 
trained the staff for three Veteran’s Employment Offices in order to find 
employment for this large force.  The soldiers were transitioned into the Facility 
Protection Service (FPS), the KRG Ministry of Interior, and two Iraqi Civil 
Defense Corps (ICDC) Battalions.  To further increase security, the 404th CA 
established the Erbil Police Academy.  This police academy was established to 
provide training for over 500 police officers for each academy class.  The 404th 
CA left Iraq in February of 2003 and transitioned to the 416th CA which was able 
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to continue the mission with approximately one third of the strength of the 404th 
CA.  Before leaving in February, the priority for the 404th CA was increasing the 
strength of the ministry of justice and developing a stronger security force.128 
2. Integration of CMO into All Phases of the Operations 
Did the ground component commanders integrate CMO into all phases of 
the operations?   Although D/96th CA and 404th CA sent planners to 10 SFG as 
early as October 2002, 10 SFG did not initially integrate the CA aspects of CMO 
into the operational planning.  However, the possibility of a DC problem did 
become the focus of CMO planning for the 404th CA Commander.  Phase IV 
planning never took a priority; however, 10 SFG did integrate CMO into all their 
planning.   As far as the execution, one could say that inserting CA forces had a 
mixed utility with 10 SFG.  Their focus was on CMO for the combat operation and 
not the reconstruction or post-conflict phase.  They did, however, fully support 
both the D/96th CA and 404th CA with resources.  The 404th CA Executive Officer 
(XO) was the chief CMO planner for 10 SFG.  Deploying to 10 SFG location six 
months prior to the invasion, he was eventually well received by 10 SFG in their 
planning cycles.  The 404th CA XO became the commander before deploying to 
Iraq, which only strengthened his relationship with 10 SFG.129 
During the execution, JSOTF-N infiltrated all of the D/96th CA teams that 
conducted the initial assessments and made key leader contacts with local 
NGOs and local ministers.  Doctrinally, this is the responsibility of the AC CA 
forces.  Once the 404th CA arrived, they immediately continued preparations for 
Phase IV.  The Kurdish area appeared completely stabilized but the ground 
forces had to contend with the Ansar Al Islam terrorists, the PKK/KADEC 
terrorists and the possibility of in fighting again between the KDP and PUK.  The 
area was by no means completely stabilized and had the potential to go bad.  
JSOTF-N exploited CMO successes with a strong PSYOP and IO campaign.130 
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Did the ground component commanders accept the role as the CMO 
commander?  The JSOTF-N commander had complete responsibility for northern 
Iraq.  Keys to JSOTF-N success included working closely with the two political 
parties.  His two battalion commanders accomplished this by working directly 
with Talabani and Barzani.  Once the 101st ABN Commander took over the AOR, 
he allowed the 404th CA Commander to continue this relationship with the 
Kurdish leadership. This presented a unique opportunity for the 404th CA but also 
a challenge in obtaining the resources needed for CMO.  The 404th CA would still 
have to compete with for CERP money and resources from the 101st ABN.  
However, the 101st ABN commander supported CMO and provided the 404th with 
the needed resources.  In addition the 404th CA kept a liaison team (LNO) at the 
101st ABN Command HQ to and utilized the 101st ABN LNOs at the Erbil 
CMOC.131 
3. Balance of CMO between the Combat and Civilian Operation 
Were the CMO missions appropriate for the operations?  The 404th CA 
conducted an appropriate mix of CMO missions to support the combat operation 
as well as the civilian operation.  Since they were the only ground force in the 
area, the missions were geared toward either the reconstruction of their AOR or 
on developing a strong security apparatus to support stabilization.  Key to this 
support of the civilian operation is developing strong HN institutions that  
continue to support U.S. politico-military goals. 
Did the ground force neglect vital CMO missions?  Once the D/96th CA 
and 404th CA entered northern Iraq, they immediately concentrated on 
reconstruction and stability after initial humanitarian aid was provided for 
returning DCs.  The 404th CA thought they would be focused on coordinating the 
return of DCs.  However, as the situation required, the 404th CA changed their 
focus to establishing a stronger security system and strengthening Kurdish 
institutions. 
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4. The Attitude of the Host Nation (HN) or Occupied Area 
To what degree did the attitude of the HN affect the ability to conduct 
CMO missions?  The attitude of the Kurds was conducive for what the 404th CA 
was attempting to accomplish.132  The Kurds had enjoyed a high degree of 
autonomy for the past 10-12 years and did not want this to change.  This created 
a concern that the Kurds might act on their desire to become an independent 
state.  Acting on this desire would not only upset the possibility of a strong Iraqi 
state but certainly cause problems with their northern neighbor Turkey.  Having a 
small U.S. force to work with the Kurds allowed the coalition to exploit the 
positive attitude of the Kurds.  Having that same force that was with the Kurds 
from the beginning remain with them was an added benefit.133 
5. Summary 
The indicators of success for the Kurdish controlled areas of Iraq appear 
positive.  While looking at the possible indicators presented earlier, CMO has 
worked to set or maintain the necessary conditions for “peace.”  The Kurds still 
have a sense of security.  This includes internal security as well as external 
security from Turkey or terrorist elements from Iran.  Northern Iraq received a 
sufficient amount of humanitarian aid to help meet their basic life necessities 
although it was not as needed as in the rest of Iraq.  The economy and 
employment for the Kurds is also doing well in the north.  The local populace is in 
full support of their Pershmerga formed police and the coalition efforts. 
Institutions are continuing to be strengthened and are definitely self-managed.134 
The Kurds are not supporting the Iraqi insurgency.   However, a few 
terrorist attacks aimed at the Kurdish leadership have occurred.  The worst 
occurred in February 2004 in Erbil when two suicide bombers killed over 105 
Kurds at a political gathering.   Besides this attack, very little insurgent activity in 
the Kurdish North has transpired.  The security system in the Kurdish North ran 
                                            
132 Harry Schute, Email to author to author, 26 August 2005.  
133 Robert Bruce, MSG, phone interview by author, 14 August 2005. 
134 Ibid. 
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by the former Kurdish Pershmerga force appears to have been mostly 
effective.135  
The variables presented resulted in CMO success for the Kurdish North.  
The integration of CMO into all phases of the operations was fair.  Although CMO 
planners planned with 10 SFG early, there was some resistance towards Phase 
IV planning.  However, 10 SFG did support the CA forces in their perceived 
future operation of reconstruction.  Once the 101st ABN commander took over, he 
focused on CMO.136  The second variable, balance of CMO between the combat 
and civilian operations, was good.  The CA forces applied the appropriate CMO 
from the beginning.  The key here was exploiting already established institutions.  
The third variable, attitude of the HN or occupied area, was always favorable.   
CMO success in northern Iraq can be attributed to a very receptive attitude of the 
Kurds. The bonds forged between 10 SFG and the Kurds continued with the 
404th CA.  The proper combination of these three variables reflected the amount 











                                             
135 Anthony H. Cordesman, “Iraq’s Evolving Insurgency,” (DRAFT), Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, 14. 
136 Harry Schute, Email to author to author, 26 August 2005. 
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IV. COMPARING AND CONTRASTING THE CASE STUDIES 
The purpose of this chapter is to compare and contrast the cases 
presented in Chapter III.  This thesis analyzes the results of the overall CMO in 
the Kurdish North, Sunni Center, and Shi’a South.   Accordingly, a comparison 
will be made of the units and the situation, to include: the external factors that 
arose from the environment, as well as the factors internal to the U.S. military 
and governmental actors involved in CMO.  
A. COMPARING CMO BY REGION 
Table 1 includes a summary of the analysis of CMO outcomes by region.  
Evaluation of each aspect of CMO performance is analyzed below. 
 
Case Study Integration137 Balance138 Attitude139 CMO 
Outcome140 
Kurdish North Fair Good Good Success 
Sunni Center Poor Fair Poor Failure 
Shi’a South Fair Fair Fair Partial 
success 
Table 1.   Comparison of CMO Outcomes by Region 
 
 
1. Integration of CMO into All Phases of the Operations 
None of the ground combatant units went beyond planning for dislocated 
civilian (DC) operations and humanitarian assistance (HA) during the initial CMO 
planning.  Although not all the ground units prepared for Phase IV, the attached 
CA units independently planned for what was needed in the reconstruction 
phase. The ground combatant units in each area thoroughly planned for the 
major combat phase of the operation but did little planning for the stabilization 
                                            
137 Variable 1: Integration of CMO into all phases of the operations. 
138 Variable 2: Balance of CMO between the combat and civilian operations. 
139 Variable 3: Attitude of the HN or occupied area. 
140 Dependent variable: Success or failure of the CMO. 
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and reconstruction of Iraq.  Once Phase IV began, the overall ground 
commanders for each of the areas supported CMO for their assigned areas. 
The difference in CMO support and integration came at the brigade level 
and below.  In the Sunni Arab area, the ground component units had the 
advantage of having their “wartrace” CA units attached.141  However, this 
advantage was not enough to break through the U.S. Army’s cultural bias of 
focusing only on major combat and not what occurs afterwards.  In the Shi’a Arab 
area, neither the Marines nor the British forces did much planning for CMO, but 
once major combat operations were over, they fully transitioned to Phase IV and 
integrated CMO into the overall operation.  The Kurdish area was a unique 
situation where the majority of the units were SOF that had had a history of 
conducting CMO in the very same area almost a decade prior.142 
It is evident from the analysis of the cases that there was a problem in 
integration of CMO in all phases of the operations.  CMO were not integrated in 
every phase of the operation even in circumstances where there were sufficient 
CMO forces and planners.  Not integrating the CMO early can be attributed to 
more than just a lack of policy and direction from a higher command.  When the 
higher command did not provide this guidance, combat leaders could have 
“reached back” and demanded the answers they needed.  Yet, this did not occur.  
The U.S. military expects combat leaders to plan, fight and accomplish the 
combat phase on minimal guidance; it should be the same for Phase IV. 
                                            
141 Global security. Military: Wartrace. Accessed 11 September 2005; Available from 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/ military/agency/army/wartrace.htm. Instituted in 1995, the U.S. 
Army’s “Wartrace Program” aligned reserve units with active units for planning and training 
exercises in the case of going to war.   
142 SOF includes SF, CA and PSYOP forces. 
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2. Balance of CMO between the Combat and Civilian Operations 
In all three regions, the coalition forces applied a variety of CMO 
throughout the full spectrum of combat operations, including the stabilization and 
reconstruction phase.  The units in these areas had to divide their resources in 
order to appropriately handle their unique situations.  In each area, units 
attempted to apply the appropriate balance between the combat and civilian 
operations.  At first, in all areas, the emphasis was placed on DC operations and 
then on providing basic life necessities.  Once this was complete, all areas 
focused on security and finally, reconstruction. 
The most significant difference among the regions centered on 
establishing the “rule of law” and creating civil order.   In the Kurdish North, the 
Pershmerga forces and the civil police had control and the CA units involved 
were able to move immediately to strengthen this “rule of law” and security while 
devoting a large amount of their CMO to the on-going long term civilian 
operations.   The Sunni Arab area was completely ransacked with looters which 
caused a setback in reconstruction and stabilization.  The units in the Shi’a South 
did exert a larger amount of control from the beginning.  Once Phase IV began in 
the Shi’a South, providing the basic life necessities remained a continuing focus.   
CA activities could have focused more on support to civil administration to 
empower the local Shi’a institutions. 
3. The Attitude of the Host Nation (HN) or Occupied Area 
In all three areas, the people were glad to have Saddam Hussein gone.  
However, this does not translate into trusting the coalition and supporting their 
efforts.  People in all areas, including the Kurds and the Shi’a Arabs, have a 
certain amount of distrust of the coalition.  In the history of all the regions, the 
people have been willing to receive help and aid, but no group wants to have an 
occupying power within their lands.  There are major differences in the attitudes 
in each region.  The Sunni Arabs had been the ruling class for over a hundred 
years.  Losing this status puts the Sunni Arabs in a non-cooperative situation.143  
                                            
143 Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield, The Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy, or 
Division? 152-153. 
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Of all the regions, the Shi’as probably had the greatest reason to distrust the 
coalition but nevertheless were willing to receive aid and become the ruling 
majority of the country.  Being the majority would allow the Shi’as to rule a 
democratic Iraq.  The Kurds appear to fully support the coalition; although this 
could change if they do not get at least a portion of what they want, which is a 
degree of autonomy and the city of Kirkuk.144   
4. The CMO Outcome 
Despite some successes in CA activities, the degree of overall CMO 
success varied greatly across the three areas.145 The Kurdish North had 
substantial success.  In the Sunni Center, CMO failed to achieve the desired 
results.  In the Shi’a South, CMO was generally successful.  Perhaps the 
greatest indicator of success is the degree to which insurgents operate in each of 
the areas: generally none in the Kurdish North, the most in the Sunni Center and 
very little in the Shi’a South.146 
                                            
144 Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield, The Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy, or 
Division? 178-183. Kirkuk has traditionally always been the spiritual center for Kurdistan. 
145 Although basic life necessities were met within a short amount of time, this is not enough 
to achieve overall CMO success. 




B. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
In addition to the variables discussed in the hypothesis, there are other 
significant comparisons that should be made that might reveal important factors.  
CMO is a complex topic; therefore it is always beneficial to look at other 
considerations that might present some explanations for the degree of success 
or failure of CMO.  Table 2 incorporates these other considerations.   
 






Kurdish North SF, CA, ABN High Yes Good 
Sunni Center Mech. Div, CA Low No Fair 
Shi’a South UK, Marines, 
CIMIC, CA 
Medium Mixed Poor 
Table 2.   Other Considerations for the Case Studies  
 
1.  The Units and Their CMO Experience 
The type and capabilities of the units in different regions varied greatly.  In 
the Kurdish North, SOF was very effective.  The 10 SFG had a large amount of 
CMO experience from previous operations.  These missions included the Joint 
Commission Observer missions in Bosnia, de-mining missions throughout 
Eastern Europe, and Operation Provide Comfort in northern Iraq.  The 4ID did 
not have near this same experience.  Although some soldiers had CMO 
experience, as a unit they had not conducted CMO.  This lack of experience was 
only compounded by a lack of CMO training.   The British in the South had 
gained CMO experience in Northern Ireland.  The Marines did not have this 
same level of experience, yet were capable of making quick changes and 
adapting to fluid situations.  In summary, the amount of integration in each of the 
areas varied depending on the level of CMO experience of the unit. 
2. Initial Units in Area 
SOF were present in the Kurdish North from the beginning of the coalition 
invasion (March 2003) and remained until at least May 2003.  This allowed SOF 
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to continue exploiting any relationships that had been built.  The Sunni Center 
was different.   The original units that first arrived in the city did not stay.  The 4ID 
prepared for operations in Tikrit, but did not arrive there until later.  In the Shi’a 
South, the British stayed in their original area and were joined by the Marines 
shortly after the major fighting ended.  The local expertise and relationships are 
important for three reasons:  first, for developing the trust and consistency that is 
needed for a successful military to civilian relationship; second, to exploit the 
“window of opportunity” that may exist for only a few days or a few weeks; and 
third, for the unit to take responsibility during this critical “window of opportunity.”  
This consideration is much a factor of time as it is familiarity.147 
3. Existing Institutions 
The Kurdish North had existing security, administrative, and social 
institutions that allowed for a faster exploitation of CMO.  The CMO forces 
usually had existing functional institutions to work with when conducting these 
missions.148  The Sunni Center did not have an effective security institution and 
any administrative institutions had been severely damaged by Ambassador 
Bremmer’s decision to de-ba’athify Iraq.  The Shi’a’s infrastructure in the south 
had been damaged by years of neglect during Saddam’s rule.  In the south much 
of the infrastructure had to be developed from scratch.149  Although this factor 
might not determine CMO success or failure, new infrastructure requirements will 
effect the time required for CMO success. 
 
                                            
147 Personal experience of author while in Iraq. 
148 Ibid. 
149 Conversation with CA officers deployed to the Shi’a South.  
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
New capabilities are required within the National Security Council, 
the State Department, and the Department of Defense for security 
and nation building missions.  It does not matter whether these are 
called post conflict, Phase IV, stabilization, or reconstruction 
missions.  The U.S. must be as prepared to win a peace as it is 
prepared to win a war.150 
      - Anthony H. Cordesman 
 
A. THE OVERALL RESEARCH QUESTION 
The intent of this thesis is to identify the conditions required for success in 
Civil Military Operations.  As stated in Chapter I, the hypothesis of this thesis 
states that the success or failure of CMO is dependent on three variables: 
Integration of CMO in all phases of the operations, the balance of CMO missions 
between combat operations and civil operations, and the attitude of the Host 
Nation (HN) or occupied area.  Key to understanding and evaluating CMO 
success was testing the hypothesis against the most current and relevant case 
study: Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).  This thesis tested the hypothesis in three 
distinct ethno-religious areas of Iraq.  
Based on the evidence of the case studies, the author draws the following 
conclusions: 
• Integration of CMO in all phases of the operations was 
demonstrated in each case to be the variable that could most easily 
be influenced internally by the unit involved.  U.S. Military culture 
and the lack of CMO experience of the ground units played the 
largest role in causing this variable to be neglected.   
• The balance of CMO missions between combat operations and civil 
operations required the most CMO expertise.  Understanding the 
responsibility of an occupying military power is critical.  When the 
ground units attempted to distribute their resources between the 
                                            
150 Anthony H. Cordesman, “The “Post Conflict” Lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan: Testimony 
to the Foreign Relations Committee,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington 
DC, May 19, 2004. 
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combat and civilian operation, the appropriate balance could not be 
met without an effective counterinsurgency strategy. 
• Attitude of the HN or occupied area appeared to have the greatest 
effect of helping or hindering the success of CMO.  This variable 
was the most difficult condition to either set or understand without 
proper intelligence and research.   
• All three variables had an effect in determining the degree of 
success or failure in each area. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The recommendations of this thesis are built upon lessons learned from 
the case study analyses.  Additionally, this thesis proposes ideas for future 
studies.  Many of these ideas are briefly discussed but were beyond the scope of 
this study.  Recommendations are either intended to exploit or mitigate the 
determining effects from the three independent variables of this thesis.  Key to all 
the recommendations is to remember that CMO is the commanders’ 
responsibility.  For CMO to be effective, commanders must make CMO inherent 
to operations and not a separate sideshow that occurs only after the battle.   
1. Military Educational System 
Based on personal experience and observance of the educational system 
in the military, CMO is barely covered in the military’s basic or advanced officer 
schooling.  If any aspect of CMO is covered, it is limited to CA operations that 
directly influence combat operations.  This lack of training begins with 
commissioning programs and continues through the basic and advanced officer 
courses.  The Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and the Army’s new 
Intermediate Level Education (ILE) do not integrate CMO into their staff training 
exercises.  Aspects of Information Operations, PSYOPS, and CA are all covered 
as part of the curriculum but CMO planning is not taught.151  To resolve this 
deficiency CMO should be introduced into every level of an officer’s military 
education. 
                                            
151 This observation was made by both a SF and CA officer currently going through the ILE 
program.  A CGCS graduate mentioned that any CMO/CA instruction was given by students. 
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One way to introduce the military to CMO is to put an active CA officer at 
the brigade level of each maneuver unit.152  Although this is a step in the right 
direction to integrate CMO, the education of the selected officer also needs to be 
examined.  The CMO training of these officers may not be adequate for this 
position.  This officer will most likely have completed 4-6 months of basic 
language training, a four month regional studies course, and a 3 ½ week CA 
course.   This training program is adequate for an already experienced Army 
Captain to conduct CA missions at the tactical level, but provides only a minimal 
amount of training in CMO, let alone integrating CMO into operations.153  There 
are no courses dedicated to CMO at the Naval Postgraduate School, where 
many CA officers receive advanced schooling.154  CA officers’ advanced 
schooling should include specific courses on CMO. 
2. Organizational 
Proposed changes in CMO organization currently call for additional CA 
forces.  Although this addresses a maneuver commander’s capability to plan for 
CMO, it may not address the concepts for CMO success.  The most important 
issue is to ensure that additional forces do not take away the ground 
commander’s responsibility for integrating CMO.   For example, during OIF, there 
was a mentality within the Army that once ground combat ended, Army combat 
units could just turn Phase IV over to CA and redeploy.  Of course this was not 
the case.  Karen Guttieri, a Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, 
identified this problem at a speech delivered to the World Wide Civil Affairs 
Conference, “Given that civil affairs is a command responsibility, perhaps it is 
worth investigating an approach that integrates rather than segregates civil-
                                            
152 Currently Brigade Combat Teams rotating into combat zones are being assigned an 
active duty CA officer. 
153 Once complete with the CA pipeline, the officer will usually do 12-24 months at the 96th 
CA.  The experience is limited and is not enough to plan for CMO beyond tactical level CA 
missions.  
154 The Defense Analysis Department offers courses in counter-insurgency and the National 
Security Affairs Department offers courses in Stabilization and Reconstruction.  There is an 
abundance of literature for these topics but very little related to CMO. 
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military operations”.155  The number of CA forces in Iraq did not effectively 
influence the degree of success or failure that occurred in the areas.   
Recommendations for changes to organizational structure should 
emphasize proficient CMO planning at every level instead of an increase in the 
number of CA forces.  Likewise, if there is an increase in CA forces, there should 
also be an increase of CA specialists who have the expertise with one of the 
functional areas that focus on support to civil administration.  Civil administration 
is the most intensive and expensive CA functional area for the military to 
develop.  However, this investment ensures that the CMO knowledge exists to 
support the civilian operations at the beginning of operations. 
Recommendations to alter organizational culture are more difficult.  First, 
the military needs to fully realize that although peacekeeping and “nation 
building” operations are CMO intensive, they are not the same.   In the past, 
CMO may have been neglected as a result of a cultural bias in the Army against 
anything to do with “nation building.”  To avoid this misconception, CMO training 
should in pre-commissioning officer programs.  There is no reason why aspects 
of CMO cannot be introduced as a vital part of military operations.  Fundamental 
to the conclusions of this thesis is that CMO must be integrated into all levels of 
the operations.  This integration of CMO should start at the beginning of an 
officer’s education.    
3. Doctrine 
Currently the Army does not have doctrine specifically for CMO.  Joint 
CMO doctrine is not sufficient to integrate CMO into all phases of the operations.  
In addition, proposed Army CA doctrine puts an emphasis on “Effects Based 
Operations” in order to ensure proper integration into the current system of 
maneuver units.  Joint doctrine emphasizes stabilization and reconstruction.156   
Recommended changes in doctrine include putting more emphasis on 
CA/CMO to support counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare.  Current 
                                            
155 Karen Guttieri, “Historical Junctures of United States Civil Affairs: Drawing from the Past 
to Plot the Future”, Center for International Security and Cooperation (Stanford University), 71. 
156 All this doctrine is still in draft form and has not yet been released. 
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doctrine only briefly explains how CMO can help to legitimize the HN through 
Military or Humanitarian Civic Action missions.157  Increased study in this area 
could improve a unit’s ability to apply the appropriate balance of both combat and 
civilian operations.  This ability is an integral part of unconventional warfare.  If 
CMO is going to be used to win the “hearts and minds” or popular support of the 
HN there must be doctrine on how this should be done.  Further study on how to 
synchronize all aspects of CMO should be considered.  
C. CONCLUSION 
 By examining the three cases using the framework of three independent 
variables, this thesis was able to draw some conclusions on what determines 
success or failure of CMO.  It is important for any unit to realize the implications 
of not properly integrating CMO into the overall operation.  Yet reading CMO unit 
AARs from Iraq gloss over the impact of the initial planning deficiencies.  For 
units to improve in CMO, they must conduct an honest assessment of CMO as 
part of an overall assessment of the entire operation.  It is as if CMO was a 
subject that few units would want to discuss afterwards in AARs.  If CMO is 
discussed, it is reduced to targeting operations to find insurgents.  This 
demonstrates the previously discussed Army’s culture bias against operations 
not considered combat operations. 
As stated before, CMO is a complex subject.  If changes are to be made in 
CMO, studies and discussion on the subject should center on the factors that can 
influence the outcome of any CMO.  The ideas contained in this thesis can be 
applied to any CMO, whether during war or peacetime.  When CMO-intensive 
operations are required in the future, the military should be better prepared to 
succeed in making a peaceful transition to civilian authorities than what occurred 
in Iraq.  Even with success in the Kurdish North, and moderate success in the 
Shi’a South, the failure in the Sunni Center will overshadow the entire operation.  
The entire operation should be viewed when attempting to transform CMO.  As 
                                            
157U.S. Joint Staff, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations. Joint Publication 3-57 and 
Department of the Army. Field Manual 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations. Washington D.C.: 
Department of the Army, 2000.  
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difficult as it is, CMO must be better understood and appreciated for a positive 
transformation to occur. 
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